CHAPTER I
Mission and Organization

(U) This history of the Air National Guard (ANG) covers the CY 1986 - CY 1991 period. Those dramatic years saw some of the most revolutionary changes on the international scene in modern times. In December 1988, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announced unilateral cuts in his nation's armed forces during a speech to the United Nations. The Berlin Wall was torn down in November 1989. Subsequently, the Warsaw Pact and most communist regimes collapsed in Eastern Europe when the Soviet leadership stood by and refused to intervene militarily. Germany was reunited. In August 1991, communist hardliners staged an abortive military coup that failed to overthrow the Soviet President. Gorbachev, who had attempted to reform the Soviet political and economic system through his program of "Glasnost" and "Perestroika", survived but the Kremlin's political power had been fatally undermined. With breathtaking speed, the Soviet Union dissolved as a unitary state and the communist party disappeared as an organized political movement within its borders. With its demise, the Cold War, which had been on the wane for several years, came to an end. Those dramatic developments drastically reduced the principal threat to American national security. Amid such epochal changes in the communist world, the United States conducted two short wars. During operation Just Cause in 1989 - 1990, American forces invaded Panama, removed its corrupt dictator from power, and brought him to the U.S. for trial on drug trafficking charges. Led by the United States, an

international coalition mounted operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm against Iraq in 1990 and 1991 respectively. The latter's seizure of its tiny, oil-rich neighbor Kuwait in August 1990 had posed a serious threat to western economies and the stability of the entire Persian Gulf region. Those highly successful military operations were conducted amid a substantial real reduction (ie., adjusted for inflation) of the U.S. defense budget that had begun in FY 1986.[1]

(U) This chapter provides an overview of the Air Guard's evolution during the CY 1986 - CY 1991 period. Its major themes are the growth, modernization, and increasing readiness of the ANG for a war that never happened as well as its efforts to begin posturing itself for the uncertainties of the post Cold War era. Specifically, the chapter covered six major topics. The first was the application of the total force policy from 1970 through 1991 which played a crucial role in fostering the Air Guard's growing military capabilities. Second, the ANG's mission and evolving force structure were examined. The third topic addressed the mission, organization, and leadership of the National Guard Bureau (NGB). Topics four and five focused on the mission, organization, and leadership of the Bureau's Air Directorate and the Air National Guard Support Center (ANGSC) respectively. The final topic examined the Air Guard's ambitious long range planning process which was launched in 1988.

The Total Force Policy

(U) Since 1970, the Department of Defense (DoD) has stressed the necessity of maintaining strong National Guard and Reserve forces. In response to America's disenchantment with the Vietnam War, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird attempted to restore public confidence in the nation's military establishment and reduce defense spending by placing greater emphasis on the reserve components. Concurrently, he reduced the size of the active force while still preparing for the possibility of a high intensity war in central Europe between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its Soviet-sponsored nemesis, the Warsaw Pact. On 21 August 1970, Secretary Laird adopted the "Total Force" concept to achieve those objectives. It sought to make certain that all " . . . policymaking, programming, and budgetary activities within the Defense Department considered active duty and reserve forces concurrently. Its ambitious objective was to determine the most advantageous mix of those forces in terms of their contribution to national security versus the cost to equip and maintain them."[2] In reaction to President Lyndon B. Johnson's decision to use draftees instead of a major reserve mobilization to fight the war in Southeast Asia, Secretary Laird stressed that "Guard and Reserve units and individuals will be the initial and primary source of augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces."[3] Secretary Laird's initial total force concept memo also provided guidance on the importance of the key elements of readiness--manning, equipment, and training--required to assure that resource allocations were based upon contingency deployments schedules rather than whether or not units belonged to the

active duty establishment.

(U) But, there was more involved in the total force concept than saving money and the military capabilities of the reserve forces. Although not publicized at the time, the underlying political motivation for it was the determination of key military and congressional leaders to prevent a repeat of a disastrous policy error during the Vietnam War. Along with lengthening casualty lists and the prospect of an endless conflict in Southeast Asia, the failure of the Johnson administration to initiate a major mobilization of the National Guard and Reserves had eventually undermined public support for the war. According to noted military analyst Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., a retired regular U.S. Army officer, General Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., recognized that connection when he instituted the "Total Army" concept in 1972. While Army Chief of Staff, the former commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam " . . . sought to eliminate the disastrous Vietnam War fallacy that wars could be fought `in cold blood' without paying the price of national mobilization."[4] General Abrams tried to fuse the active Army and its reserve components into a single coherent force. In effect, he and his successors made it impossible for the Army to go to war against a major opponent without mobilizing the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). According to Colonel Summers, "It was precisely what some saw as the reserves greatest weakness - their political sensitivity - that Gen. Abrams recognized as their greatest strength."[5] The Army Chief of Staff understood that the Guard and Reserves, not draftees, were the real links between the

American people and the active duty military establishment.

(U) The Nixon administration also found the "total force" concept useful on Capitol Hill. Sensitive to the intensity of anti-military congressional feeling in the early 1970s, the administration stressed that a much larger share of the nation's scaled-back defense budgets was going to the reserve components. Although military spending dropped dramatically from 42.1 percent of the federal budget when Richard Nixon was inaugurated in 1969 to 23.7 percent in 1977 when Gerald Ford left the White House, the dollars devoted to the reserve components rose significantly. For example, the budgets of the National Guard and Reserves nearly doubled between fiscal year (FY) 1968 and FY 1974. Approximately 50 percent of that increase was driven by pay increases associated with the all-volunteer force and inflation.[6]

(U) For its part, the Air Force had been using a total force approach to reserve components management for years before Secretary Laird issued his policy statement in August 1970. In particular, the Air National Guard had been steadily integrated into the everyday operations of the active duty establishment since it began augmenting the Air Force's air defense runway alert program on a continuing basis in 1954. The gaining command concept of reserve forces management, implemented on 1 July 1960, pushed the process of integration further along. Its key provisions made the commanders of the major air commands (MAJCOMS) that were assigned ANG and Air Force Reserve (AFRES) units in contingency plans responsible for training and inspecting them in peacetime. Previously,

those functions had been handled by a separate Air Force organization, the Continental Air Command. Although the National Guard Bureau (NGB) had pressed for it since 1954, the Air Force had resisted the gaining command approach to reserve forces management largely because its MAJCOMs had not been eager to undertake that additional responsibility in the 1950s. By 1970, the ANG and AFRES had become closely integrated into the planning, programming, budgeting and operational processes of the active duty Air Force.

(U) Several other key factors contributed to the success of the air reserve components. They enjoyed relatively high percentages of skilled prior service personnel and high levels of full-time personnel assigned to their units compared to other reserve programs. Approximately 25 percent of the Air Guard's strength consisted of full - time personnel. The active duty Air Force supported additional training days for aircrews substantially beyond the minimum monthly weekend drill requirements. Both the ANG and the AFRES were managed by members of their own respective components in the NGB and Headquarters, Air Force Reserve respectively. The technologically intensive nature of the Air Force made it easier for the air reserve components to function at a high state of readiness. Finally, the military success of the ANG and AFRES since the Korean War had generated growing political and budgetary support for them on Capitol Hill. The history of those programs had heavily influenced Dr Theodore Marrs, Mr Laird's Deputy Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. Dr Marrs, an avid promoter of the Air Guard and a former Alabama Air Guardsman, had

effectively promoted the total force idea within the Air Force and the Department of Defense. He stressed that the reserve components were a cost effective answer to the challenges posed by the relatively austere defense budgets of the Nixon administration. His ideas were apparently very influential with Secretary Laird.[7]

(U) Acknowledging that substantial progress had been made in implementing the total force concept, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger upgraded its official status on 23 August 1973. He wrote that the "Total Force is no longer a concept. It is now a Total Force Policy which integrates the active, Guard, and reserve forces into a homogenous whole."[8] However, Schlesinger was aware that, while progress had been made, the reserve components were still not fully prepared to play their assigned wartime roles. Consequently, he ordered a study of their mobilization availability, force mix, limitations, and potential missions in future contingencies, especially a war in central Europe between the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The resulting study, "The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force," was released in June 1975. Overall, it was a disappointment devoid of innovative ideas and policies. However, it did single out the Air Force for coming the closest of any of the services to actually achieving the objectives of the total force policy. The report stressed that the Air Guard and the Air Force Reserve had the highest percentage of combat ready units among the reserve components. It attributed much of that success to the impact of the gaining command concept. The report recommended three categories of improved total

force management across the Defense Department. First, better mobilization planning and management were required for all manpower categories including active duty and reserve components personnel. Second, Guard and Reserve forces needed equipment comparable to that employed by their active duty counterparts so that they could perform as first line forces. Third, the reserve forces had to be more fully integrated with the active force to improve their training and readiness.[9]

(U) In 1974, the Congress had begun taking a more active role in supporting the total force policy. Early that year Secretary Schlesinger announced that the Defense Department would deactivate the last eleven ARNG NIKE-HEURCULES missile batteries and six ANG fighter interceptor squadrons because of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. Congress and the National Guard constituency were intensely opposed to reductions in the Guard's force structure. Consequently, the FY 1975 Appropriations Authorization Act required the DoD to maintain 91 flying units in the ANG. Because of their technological obsolescence and changes in U.S. strategy that downgraded the Soviet manned bomber threat, the NIKE-HEURCULES batteries were deactivated as planned. The whole episode was significant because it signaled congressional intervention in major reserve force structure issues. Previously, Capitol Hill had concentrated on general policy and management issues featured in legislation like the "Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act of 1967." Congress continued to actively insert itself in reserve policy formulation through

the appropriations process during the 1980s. In the latter period, it was especially concerned with assuring that the reserve components were adequately provided with enough modern weapons and equipment to fulfill their assigned contingency roles under the total force policy. In essence, it agreed with the analysis of the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) in January 1981 that, despite the progress that had been made " . . . a giant chasm still exists between Total Force Policy and reality. . . . [The policy] envisions three things: compatibility, sustainability and reliability. These characteristics are not present in our Total Force today to the degree and level required."[10] Although the ANG was singled out as an exception to that disappointing analysis of the total force, its significant shortcomings--especially an aging aircraft fleet--clouded its future.[11]

(U) By 1990, the reserve components of the American armed services had made significant strides under the auspices of the total force policy and the Reagan defense buildup. Reserve component appropriations for personnel, operations and maintenance, and military construction climbed from $ 7,621.6 million in FY 1981 to $ 16,474.4 million in FY 1990. In addition, $ 3,865.8 million in procurement funds were allocated to the reserve components during the latter year. Guard and Reserve units were integrated into many theater operations plans. Under a policy promulgated by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger on 21 June 1982, the Defense Department had devoted substantial amounts of modern equipment to early deploying Reserve and Guard units. Weinberger emphasized that " . . . units that fight first

[whether they belong to the active force or reserve components] shall be equipped first regardless of component." But, the realities of DoD programming and budgeting often fell short of that rational goal. Consequently, Congress intervened to strengthen the equipment inventories of the reserve components. For example, from FY 1982 through FY 1990, Capitol Hill had dedicated $ 5,824 million in appropriations for Guard and Reserve equipment beyond what the Defense Department had requested. The Air Guard's share of those additional appropriations was $ 1,340 million. Despite those gains, the Reserve Forces Policy Board reported substantial major wartime equipment shortfalls in its FY 1990 report. They were mainly in the Army National Guard, $ 9.1 billion, and the Army Reserve, $ 3.9 billion.

(U) Full-time support personnel* assigned to the selected reserve had grown dramatically from 77,200 in FY 1981 to 175,968 by the end of FY 1989. Much greater emphasis was placed upon overseas training for Reservists and Guardsmen throughout the DoD. During FY 1981, 19,824 members of the reserve components organized in 571 cells or units trained overseas. By FY 1990, those numbers had soared to 94,302 personnel in 2,987 cells or units. The Defense Department had clearly made an enormous allocation of resources to the reserve forces implying that it considered

*U) Full-time support personnel were assigned to Reserve and Guard organizations to aid in administration, logistics, personnel management, recruiting, retention, and training. In the ANG, they included military technicians, Active Guard/Reserve officers (AGRs), active duty U.S. Air Force personnel, and civil service personnel.

them essential elements of American national security policy. In April 1990, the RFPB underscored that point. It concluded that "Large - scale combat operations could not be successfully conducted without the reserve components. Since the Total Force Policy was implemented, the reserve components have achieved unprecedented levels of capability and readiness."[12]

(U) Despite the resources lavished on the reserve components during the Reagan defense buildup in the 1980s, Congress remained skeptical about the effectiveness of the total force policy as implemented by the Defense Department. For example, Congresswoman Beverly B. Byron (D. MD), who chaired the Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), asked the United States Government Accounting Office (GAO) to examine the process used in the Defense Department to assign missions to the reserve components. The final report --based upon interviews with unidentified senior officers and staff of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Army and Air National Guard, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) -- was released on 7 December 1989. The GAO found that the OSD and the services made force mix decisions as part of their force structure and budgeting processes. However, it " . . . could not determine the relative influence of the various factors on force mix decisions or the thoroughness of the decision processes. . . . There is little documentation of decision-making regarding reserve components within those processes." The Air Force relied on its formal board

structure* in the Pentagon to reach a consensus between the active duty establishment and its reserve components on force mix. But, the service's application of specific criteria for making those decisions was fluid to the say the least. According to the GAO, " . . . none of the criteria have been formally adopted by the Air Force for use on an ongoing basis." Overall, the GAO concluded that the services employed largely informal criteria to make reserve force mix decisions. Although it did not make a formal recommendation in December 1989, the GAO cited one of its own earlier reports that had urged the Secretary of Defense to provide the armed services with stronger guidance in assigning roles to the reserve forces. It also noted that the Defense Department was conducting its own internal force mix study under the direction of Mr Christopher Jehn, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel.[13]

(U) The GAO's report on reserve roles did not lower the anxiety level on Capitol Hill. Consequently, in Section 1101 of the FY 1990-91 Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to review the implementation of the policy and formulate recommendations to improve it. The report was due to Capitol Hill in December 1990. In response, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney established a total force policy study group on 26 December 1989. Mr Jehn chaired the group. The vice chairman was Mr Stephen Duncan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. Maj Gen Philip G. Killey, Director of the Air

*(U) For a detailled discusssion of the Air Force board structure, see Chapter II, "Budget."

National Guard, was appointed as one of the Air Force members of the study group.[14]

(U) The deliberations of the study group were surrounded by controversies involving the future composition of the shrinking American military establishment in the post cold war era and the mobilization of Army National Guard combat "round out" brigades during operation Desert Storm. An interim total force report delivered by the Defense Department to the Congress in September 1990 was widely criticized on Capitol Hill as "incomplete and non-responsive." According to press accounts, the interim report provided a short review of the Department's force structure but failed to shed any light on the Pentagon's review of the utilization and coordination of its reserve components.

(U) Congressional critics had also expected that the report would also provide justification for the administration's defense budget request. The HASC Chairman, Representative Les Aspin (D. WI) and other members of Congress were especially critical of DoD's failure to mobilize Army combat round-out units from the National Guard. The study group's final report, released on 31 December 1990 hardly assuaged its critics. Essentially, it called for less reliance on the reserve forces in future contingencies than under current policies. For example, it proposed that American active duty forces should be able to sustain themselves in contingencies overseas for the first 30 days without relying on Guardsmen and Reservists. It also called

for cuts of 240,0000 reserve components members by FY 1996 that would nearly match the planned drawdown of 300,000 personnel from the active duty establishment. Critics of the report on Capitol Hill and in the Guard and Reserve communities charged that it basically amounted to a rejection of the total force policy in an effort to maintain as large an active duty establishment in the post cold war era. Essentially, they saw it as a thinly-veiled argument of justification for the base force plan for a large post-Cold War active duty military force put forth by Gen Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(U) Critics further alleged that the total force study neglected a key lesson of the Vietnam War, the need to enlist the support of the American people and their elected representatives in future contingencies. That support had ebbed away during the Southeast Asia conflict when the Johnson administration had elected to rely on conscription instead of a massive mobilization of the reserve components. In addition to their military capabilities, the latter provided a bridge between the active duty military establishment and virtually every community in America. Pentagon officials rejected such charges. Instead they lauded the performance of the reserve components in the Persian Gulf and emphasized that the proper future role of the reserves was subject to public debate and decision. The Bush administration remained publicly committed to the total force policy. It emphasized that the total force policy study merely represented the administration's official view of how the role of the reserve force's should be recast in the

dramatically changed international security circumstances of the 1990s.[15]

(U) The Air Guard, when questioned by a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee (HAC) during the FY 1992 defense appropriations hearings about the total force report, provided an ambivalent written response. On the one hand, it praised it as " . . . a significant step toward providing a valuable tool for the study of the relationship between the active components and their counterparts."[16] But, it also cautioned against measures designed to cut costs by reducing the ANG's readiness and combat capability. The Air Guard was determined to avoid being placed in " . . . some lower, second-class citizen readiness level. . . . Cost should not be the driving factor for determining force mix, but neither should a mix of forces that is economical and meets national security [needs] be rejected due to a `business as usual' view of the force mix." The Air Guard concluded that "Service methodologies for determining force mix should continue to be an open forum for discussion of mix options."[17]

The Air National Guard

(U) The ANG was unique among the world's air forces with its dual state and federal roles. When not in a mobilized status, its units were commanded by the governors of fifty states, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Territories of Guam and the Virgin Islands, and the Commanding General of the District of Columbia National Guard. In that non-federal status, those units primarily assisted in disaster relief and

the preservation of domestic order.[18] The ANG also had a key federal mission under the total force policy. In that capacity, the Air Guard along with the Air Force Reserve were ". . . the initial and primary sources of augmentation forces in an emergency that requires rapid and substantial augmentation of U.S. Air Force combat capability."[19] Primarily because of its federal role, the ANG had grown since World War II into a large, well-equipped, and highly-trained modern force held in a high state of combat readiness. Either the President or the Congress could call ANG units into federal service to enforce federal statutes, suppress insurrection, repel invasion, or engage in military operations overseas. ANG units were assigned in peacetime to major Air Force commands which advised them and evaluated their training, safety, and readiness programs. Those same commands were scheduled to gain those same units in the event the latter were mobilized for federal service.[20]

(U) The Air Guard's core force structure of flying squadrons had increased from 91 to 92 in the early 199Os. Its senior leadership had resisted Air Force pressures during the 1980s to expand that force structure significantly. The Air Force had been seeking a way to bridge the gap between its ambitious force structure growth goals and funding constraints. Maj Gen John B. Conaway, then Director of the ANG, rejected the idea of increasing the number of Air Guard flying units. Instead, it opted for "robusting" or increasing the number of primary authorized aircraft (PAA) in those organizations. In March 1985, he told a congressional subcommittee that " As more modern aircraft and equipment

become available, robusting some of our current units will continue to provide increased capability at relatively low cost. Establishment of new combat flying units of the Air National Guard, rather than robusting, would not add more overall capability nor be more cost effective."[21] Air Guard leaders may have also calculated that it would be politically painful to eliminate flying units if that force structure had to be reduced at some future date. So, in addition to "robusting," their solution was to modernize the Air Guard's aircraft inventory, and intensify the emphasis on readiness. Modern fighter aircraft such as the F-15 and the F-16 entered the ANG's inventory. Its personnel strength grew from about 100,000 to some 118,000 military members. That growth was fueled both by the needs of more complex modern aircraft and a steady expansion of ANG support units in such areas as based fixed communications and computers, combat information systems, medical, civil engineering and communications.

(U) Driven by the necessity to meet the challenge of a possible high-intensity war against the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies in central Europe, the Air Guard evolved into a true force in reserve according to its senior leadership. It was held in a high state of readiness, prepared to back the active duty Air Force on short notice. Through the generous defense budgets of the 1980s under President Reagan's military buildup, strong congressional support for new reserve forces weapons and equipment, and the Air Force's determination to avoid the "hollow force" of the immediate post-Vietnam era, the Air Guard put real teeth in the total force policy. Its leaders were convinced that the

ANG's investment in modernization and readiness paid off in the high level of performance during operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield. Essentially, individual Air Guard volunteers and mobilized units were quickly integrated into the Air Force during those operations. They arrived at their duty stations with the right equipment, were well trained, and performed their duties in a manner that was virtually indistinguishable from their active duty counterparts.[22]

(U) The Air Guard had been born after World War II as primarily a fighter force. The final ANG plan, approved by the Army Chief of Staff on 25 April 1946, had called for 514 units spearheaded by 72 fighter squadrons and 12 light bomber squadrons. Its primary mission had been the air defense of the continental United States. The ANG's projected personnel strength had been approximately 58,000. However, because of obsolete equipment as well as the lack of real missions and effective training, the Air Guard had been more of a government-sponsored flying club than an effective reserve component of the Air Force in the late 1940s. That sorry state of affairs had been dramatically illustrated by the debacle that accompanied the mobilization of Air Guard units during the Korean War.

(U) Through the 1950s, stimulated by the adoption of the air defense runway alert program begun on an experimental basis in 1953, the Air Guard evolved into a fighter interceptor force that was increasingly integrated with the planning and operations of the Air Force on a regular basis. By the late 1950s, the Air Guard had become a more capable

and diverse organization whose force structure included tactical fighter and reconnaissance, troop carrier, heavy airlift, and aeromedical evacuation units. But, while it continued to modernize its weapons systems, its aircraft were still obsolescent by active duty Air Force standards. For example, by 1960 its fighter inventory consisted entirely of jets including F-100s, F-104s, F-84s, and F-89Js. By the end of FY 1960, the Air Guard's personnel strength had grown to about 71,000.

(U) Driven by the Kennedy administration's adoption of the "flexible response" strategy and the large American military buildup during the 1960s, the Air Guard continued to modernize and diversify its aircraft inventory. However, its total aircraft inventory shrank from 2,269 in 1960 to 1,425 by 1965. Following the end of active American military involvement in the Vietnam War in 1973, there was a substantial reduction in the active duty Air Force enabling the ANG to acquire another infusion of modern aircraft and equipment. These included A-7s, A-10A's, F-105s, OA-37s and some brand new C-130H's. But, its principal fighter aircraft such as F-4s had logged many flying hours including combat operations in Vietnam before they came to the Guard. The Air Guard's personnel strength stood at over 90,300 by the end of FY 1973.

(U) The military expansion begun by the Carter administration in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and accelerated by the Reagan administration, launched another round of Air Guard growth and modernization.

Its assigned personnel strength stood at 109,398 at the start of FY 1986. That figure had risen steadily to 117,786 by the end of FY 1991. The number of assigned full time support personnel increased from 31,712 to 35,810 during the same period. Overseas training and deployments were key ingredients promoting increased Air Guard readiness. During FY 1986, 7,420 Air Guardsmen organized in 80 cells or units trained outside the continental United States. In FY 1991, 10,455 of them organized in 149 cells or units trained abroad. The Guard's fighter, reconnaissance, and tactical air support forces deployed overseas to support the Tactical Air Command's (TAC's) "Checkered Flag" deployments and theater exercises such as "Reforger" and "Ocean Safari." ANG tankers deployed annually to the European and Pacific theaters to support overseas and deployed forces. Its C-130 units participated in exercises, scheduled rotations, special assignment air missions, Guardlift missions, USAF airlift augmentation missions, and the Volant Partner deployment program overseas. In addition, personnel from many different communications, engineering, and other non-flying mission support units were actively involved in deployments and exercises around the world.

(U) As indicated on Illustration I-1, the Air Guard increased its total number of flying units from 91 to 92 between FY 1985 and FY 1991. While still primarily a fighter force, the ANG's flying units were increasingly concentrated in the airlift and tanker mission areas.

Illustration I - 1 (U)

Air National Guard Flying Squadrons*

FY 1985		FY 1991	
2	Aerospace Rescue/Recovery		
13	Air Refueling	3	Air Rescue
11	Fighter Interceptor	13	Air Refueling
19	Tactical Airlift	12	Fighter Interceptor
34	Tactical Fighter	20	Tactical Airlift
6	Tactical Reconnaissance	31	Tactical Fighter
3	Tactical Air Support	6	Tactical Reconnaissance
1	Special Operations	3	Tactical Air Support
1	Military Airlift	1	Special Operations
1	Composite	2	Strategic Airlift
91	Squadrons	92	Squadrons

* SOURCES: Hist (U), ANG, CY 1985, p 297; Extracts (U), NGB Issue Book, Maj Gen Philip G. Killey, Director, ANG, "Section V. Air National Funded Squadrons and PAA Aircraft," 6 Feb 92, **SD I-11A**. The Air Guard also listed eight combat crew training squadrons in its force structure at the end of FY 1991.

(U) Although it had obtained more modern aircraft since the mid-1980s, most of them were still hand-me-downs that did not incorporate the most advanced equipment employed by the active duty Air Force. For example, the Guard's F-16 fighters were only prepared for daylight missions because they were not equipped with low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN) pods. Indeed, the ANG continued to fly A-7D/K Corsair II fighters as well as C-130A and C-130B transports that featured 1950s vintage technology. Those weapons systems were difficult to support and operate because they were no longer part of the active duty Air Force's inventory. Consequently, it was often difficult to secure spare parts and operational expertise on their wartime employment. However, the Air Guard continued to obtain some brand new C-130H transports because of the high level of congressional interest in that program.[23]

(U) During the fiscal year ending 30 September 1991, six additional aircraft conversions were scheduled.[*] The total Air Guard inventory declined slightly from over 1,600 aircraft on 30 September 1985 to 1,551 by 30 September 1991.[24] Illustration I-2 indicates the distribution of the Air Guard's Primary Authorized Aircraft (PAA) by mission and aircraft type for FY 1991 as well as its programmed force in FY 1992 and FY 1993. Illustration I-3 displays the displays the major air command assignments of the ANG's wings and groups.

---

[*] (U) ANG aircraft conversions during FY 1991 were: one squadron of F-16A/Bs (from A-7Ds); one squadron of MH-60Gs (from H-3s); one squadron of C-130Hs (from C-130Bs); one

(U) Mission support units played an increasingly important role in the Air Guard during the 1986 - 1991 period. By the end of the latter year, it featured 1084 such units that provided communications, weather, tactical control, medical, security, aerial port, civil engineering, and other services.[25] Illustration I-4 displays the Air Guard's non-flying mission support units and state headquarters organizations at the end of FY 1991.

---

squadron commissioned with eight KC-135Es; one squadron commissioned with two HC-130s; and one squadron commissioned with four MH-60Gs. SOURCE: Rprt (U), RFPB, "FY 1991 Reserve Component Programs," p 140.

Illustration I-2 (U)
ANG Primary Authorized Aircraft*

* SOURCE: Rprt (FOUO), NGB/XO, "Air National Guard Facts and Figures," 15 Jul 91, pp 7 - 8, info used was (U), **SD I-15**.

Illustration I-2, Continued (U)

Illustration I-3 (U)
Air National Guard Major Command Assignments*

* SOURCE: Chart (U), "The Air National Guard By Major Command Assignment (As of January 1, 1991)," AIR Force Magazine, May 1991, p 127.

Illustration I-4 (U)
Air Guard Mission Support Units*
(Non - Flying)

* SOURCE: Rprt (U), NGB/XO, Air National Guard Facts and Figures, Jun 91, p 2, info used was (U), SD I-15.

The National Guard Bureau

(U) The National Guard Bureau was originally established in 1908 as the Division of Militia Affairs in the Adjutant General's Office of the War Department. Authorized by the Militia Act of 1903, it was part of an extensive reform program to correct the military weaknesses demonstrated during the Spanish-American War in 1898. The division consisted of a regular Army officer and four clerks. The National Defense Act of 1916 transformed the militia of the individual states into a reserve component of the U.S. Army and made the term "National Guard" mandatory. It transformed the Division of Militia Affairs into a separate Militia Bureau in the Office of the Secretary of War and authorized National Guard officers to be assigned to the organization for the first time. In 1920, Congress directed that the bureau would be headed by a National Guard officer. Maj Gen George C. Rickards of Pennsylvania became the first Guardsman to hold that position on 29 June 1921. On 15 June 1933, the organization was redesignated the National Guard Bureau by an amendment to the National Defense Act of 1916. During World War II, with the entire National Guard in federal service, the NGB's workload and staff shrank significantly. The Bureau was banished to the organizational fringes of the Army until May 1945 when it was established as a War Department special staff activity.

(U) The National Security Act of 1947 set up the basic structure for the postwar U.S. military establishment. Among other provisions, it created the U.S. Air Force as a separate service and established a new division within the NGB to help manage one of its reserve components, the Air Guard. On 1 October 1948, the NGB was reorganized as an Army bureau and an Air Force agency to facilitate its dual function. Following a battle between the Air Force and the NGB over control of the ANG, separate bureaus for Army and Air matters were rejected in 1950. Instead, increased powers were given to the Army and Air division heads at the expense of the Chief, NGB. In August 1958 Congress passed a bill that made the NGB a joint bureau of the Army and Air Force. It also strengthened the NGB Chief's position by designating him the advisor to the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff on National Guard matters. Those changes were implemented on 10 July 1959 by AR 130-5/AFR 45-2 which redesignated the Army Division the "Office of the Assistant Chief, NGB, for Army National Guard" and the Air Division as the "Office of the Assistant Chief, NGB, for Air National Guard." In 1970, the titles of those offices were changed again to the "Director, Army National Guard" and the "Director, Air National Guard." In 1979, a third star was authorized for the head of the NGB. Lt Gen LaVern E. Weber, an Army Guardsman, was its first recipient. The directors of the Army and Air Guard remained major generals. From its humble beginnings in the War Department, the NGB had evolved into a major staff and operating agency of the Department of Defense employing over 400 assigned personnel.[26]

(U) The NGB was a joint agency of the Departments of the Army and Air Force established in law (ie., Section 3040 of Title 10, United States Code). It reported to the civilian heads of those two services through their respective chiefs of staff. The Bureau was both a staff and an operating agency. In the latter capacity, it worked with the Army and Air staffs to develop programs involving the ANG and the ARNG. On the operational side, the Bureau developed and administered programs to train, develop, and maintain the ANG and its Army counterpart. The NGB was also the designated channel of communications between the states, territories, and the Department of the Air Force and the Department of the Army. The Chief of the NGB, a lieutenant general appointed by the President, was the primary advisor to the Air Force and Army chiefs of staff on National Guard matters. He was appointed for a term of no more than four years and was eligible for reappointment.

(U) On 20 November 1986, Lt Gen Herbert R. Temple, Jr., Chief of the NGB, directed an internal analysis of the Bureau's organization. After 17 months, a study group reported back to him with suggestions intended primarily to strengthen his authority within the Bureau and to present a unified "NGB view" when dealing with the armed services, the Defense Department, and the Congress. The centerpiece of the reorganization was a proposal to create an NGB Vice Chief from the opposite service of the Chief to help the latter exercise more centralized control of the Bureau. General Temple accepted that key recommendation. The Vice Chief, a major general, would be appointed by the Secretary of Defense with the advice and consent of the service secretaries. Along with the Chief, he would serve as an advisor to the military heads of the Army and Air Force. In addition to acting as head of the NGB in the absence of the Chief, the Vice Chief oversaw the work of the Bureau's staff. Maj Gen John B. Conaway, Director of the Air National Guard, was appointed by Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci to fill the new position on 21 July 1988. General Conaway also continued to perform the duties of the ANG Director until the latter position was filled by another officer.

(U) General Conaway became Chief of the Bureau and elevated to the rank of lieutenant general on 5 February 1990. He was only the second Air Guardsman to hold that post on a permanent basis. The first was Maj Gen Winston P. Wilson who served in that position from 31 August 1963 until 31 August 1971. Brig Gen William A. Navas, Jr., the Deputy Director of the Army National Guard, was appointed to the post of Vice Chief of the Bureau on 2 July 1990. He received his second star on 1 November 1990.

(U) The Chief's principal assistant for ANG matters was the Director of the Air National Guard, a major general appointed by the Secretary of the Air Force from among the ranks of Air Guardsmen having at least 10 years of commissioned service in the active Air Guard in the period immediately before the appointment. Like the NGB Chief, he was eligible to succeed himself. Brig Gen Philip G. Killey was recalled to active duty from his post as Adjutant General for South Dakota by the Secretary of the Air Force and appointed to the post on 1 November 1988 to replace General Conaway. On 19 April 1989, General Killey obtained his second star.[27]

(U) At a senior Air Guard commanders' conference conducted in Louisville, Kentucky on 15-17 November 1988, General Killey discused his priorities and concerns. Despite changes in the Kremlin's leadership, the continuing Soviet military threat topped his list of worries. Within the Air Guard, he focused on reorganizing the NGB's Air Directorate and personnel issues. The new ANG Director assured his audience that the Air Directorate was reorganizing the Air National Guard Support Center in a move designed to assure " . . . more effective interface with the major commands (in the field)." His staff was also studying training requirements to increase the emphasis given to wartime tasks. Grade restrictions on AGR members were his top personnel priority and he intended to seek congressional help in solving that problem. He also stressed the need to be more competitive with the private sector in retaining critical skills in the technician force. General Killey listed ten goals for the Air Guard in 1989, his first full year on the job. First, make certain its weapon systems were prepared to counter the military threat and fulfill global tasks under the total force policy. Second, he wanted ANG units to attain a C-1 combat readiness rating. Third, units would maintain combat readiness while achieving a 100 percent pass rate on inspections. Fourth, minority personnel strength would reflect the composition of the local community and equal opportunity for all would be emphasized. Fifth, units would recruit and retain all personnel needed to meet 100 percent of all essential wartime requirements. Sixth, readiness would be strengthened by making certain that all ANG members, except those in the training and education pipeline, occupied

valid authorized unit positions. Seventh, ensure that the loss rate of personnel with under 20 years of service did not go any higher than 10 percent. Eighth, promote a healthy and safe work environment. That included maintaining a flight accident rate below two per 100,000 flying hours and 25 fewer ground safety mishaps. Ninth, achieve computer literacy especially among senior managers. Finally, General Killey sought to promote effective leadership that communicated well, made efficient use of resources, and minimized the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse in their organizations.[28]

(U) The Bureau was organized into four basic elements responsible to the Chief and Vice Chief. Separate directorates exercised the Bureau's functions with respect to the Army and Air National Guard. A joint staff -- consisting of an Administrative Services Division, Office of the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting, Office of Internal Review and Audit Compliance, Assistant for Property and Fiscal Affairs and Special Competition Advocate, Directorate of Personnel Resources, Office of Military Support, Joint Planning and Development Group, Contracting Support Office, and an Office of Policy and Liaison--reported directly to the Vice Chief. In addition, five special staff offices -- the Chief Counsel, General Officer Management, the Inspector General, Public Affairs, and Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization--reported to the Vice Chief. Prior to the creation of the Vice Chief's position in 1988, joint offices had reported to a Director of the Joint Staff who had been a colonel. [29] Illustrations I-5 and I-6 depict the National Guard Bureau's organization at the end of FY 1986 and FY 1990 respectively. Illustration I-7 shows the Bureau's assigned military and civilian personnel strengths at the beginning of CY 1986, CY 1988, and CY 1991.

(U) General Conaway took over the helm of the Guard Bureau during a period of historic changes in the world. The Warsaw Pact had dissolved and the Cold War had ended. In 1991, the Soviet Union and the military threat it had represented since the late 1940s, evaporated. American military budgets which had been shrinking in real, inflation-adjusted terms since the mid-1980s, began a sharp decline. The active duty military establishment faced severe personnel and force structure cuts. However, the Chief of the Bureau saw opportunities for the National Guard in the situation. He emphasized that both the Army and Air Guard would benefit from significant equipment fallout from their active duty counterparts. As the active duty establishment shrunk, the Guard was destined to play a larger role in the national defense. With the disappearance of the threat of a high intensity conflict in Europe between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, the Guard would have to begin preparing for smaller and shorter duration conflicts in the third world according to General Conaway. Moreover, he expected that the Guard would be called upon to perform newer missions that "added value to America." These included environmental cleanup and prevention of pollution at National Guard installations, a larger role in drug interdiction and demand reduction, and youth programs. In reality, the NGB, under General Conaway's leadership actively pursued such new missions that transcended the Guard's established federal and state missions. They were lumped together as a new "community mission." In historical terms, the "community mission" was reminiscent of the small regular Army's role as a peacetime frontier constabulary and uniformed civil service in the

nineteenth century.[30]

(U) The Chief of the Bureau focused on the long range challenges facing the National Guard in "Vision 2020," a report issued on 21 August 1991. General Conaway presented them in the form of ten specific goals to help the Guard prepare for the 21st century. The first and overarching one was to maintain "The Highest State of Readiness . . . . through quality equipped, trained and motivated forces led by quality leaders." Second, the Guard would "preserve and protect our future by insuring that every man and woman has an equal opportunity for entry into the National Guard. Once a part of the National Guard, every individual must have an equal opportunity to plan and develop a productive and personally rewarding career." Third, it would increase its aid to "law enforcement efforts to interdict and eradicate illegal drugs [as well as] . . . . reduce the user demand of drugs . . . . " The fourth goal was to provide an "Effective Response to Natural and Man-Made Emergencies." Fifth, the Guard would continue to protect and promote a cleaner environment. Sixth, the Guard would continue to cultivate strong community support for itself by educating the public about its role in national security and the well-being of America's citizens. Seventh, it would continue to work for strong support among the civilian employers of Guard members. Eighth, the Guard would work to improve the quality of life for the families of its members. Ninth, it would stress more effective management of all of its resources. Finally, it would "Institutionalize Total Quality Management (TQM) within the National Guard."[31]

Illustration I-5 (U)
NGB Organization, 30 September 1986*

*SOURCE: Office Memorandum 10-5/23-1 (U), Departments of the Army and the Air Force, NGB, "Organization and Functions Of The National Guard Bureau," 30 Sep 86, p 5.

Illustration I - 6 (U)
NGB Organization, 30 September 1990[*]

[*] SOURCE: Rprt (U), C/NGB, FY 1990 Annual Review, p 4.

Illustration I-7 (U)
NGB, Assigned Personnel *
(As of 1 January)

Military:

	1986	1988	1991
ARNG	50	50	50
Army	61	61	53
ANG	37	35	46
USAF	52	52	50
	200	198	203

Civilian:

Army	136	136	118
USAF	92	91	95
	228	227	213
Grand Total	**428**	**425**	**416**

* SOURCES: 1986 National Guard Almanac (Washington, D.C.: Unifirmed Services Almanac, Inc., 28 Feb 86), p 76; 1988 National Guard Almanac (Washington, D.C.: Uniformed Services Almanac, Inc., 28 Feb 88), p 73; 1991 National Guard Almanac (Washington, D.C.: Uniformed Services Almanac, Inc., 27 Feb 91), p 72.

The Air Directorate, NGB

(U) By regulation of the Departments of the Army and Air Force, the Air Guard Director acted under the supervision and control of the NGB's Chief to perform the latter's administrative and operational functions with respect to the state and federal roles of the ANG. The Chief of the NGB was also responsible for prescribing the organization, functions, and responsibilities of the office of the Air Guard Director.[32] Officially, the Air Guard Director coordinated with Air Force headquarters " . . . in the development of programs, policies, concepts, and plans pertaining to the ANG and the Total Force Program." In addition, he administered federal Air Guard " . . . activities to assure properly trained and equipped forces are combat ready to augment active force units during mobilization." He was also the Commander of the Air National Guard Support Center (ANGSC) located at Andrews AFB, Maryland. Furthermore, he provided guidance and assistance to the states on Air Guard matters.[33]

(U) The Air Guard's Director functioned in close coordination with the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Air Staff. The Director and his deputy were appointed as general officers in the active duty U.S. Air Force. Under the auspices of the total force policy, the ANG was integrated in most operational mission areas of the Air Force as well as in its formal planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS). Sometimes Air Force headquarters tended, mistakenly, to view the Air Directorate as part of the Air Staff. In the spring of 1991, for example, USAF headquarters improperly redesignated "NGB/CF" as "AF/NG." The Chief of the National Guard Bureau had to remind the Air Force Chief of Staff that, by law, the Air Directorate was part of his staff and not an element of the Air Staff. The Air Directorate was not included in 10 USC 3031 and 8031 which prescribed the organization of the Army and Air staffs. Consequently, USAF Headquarters quietly withdrew the improper "AF/NG" designation.

(U) By law, 60 percent of the officers assigned to the Air Directorate were active duty Air Force officers while the remaining 40 percent were Air Guardsmen. The organization and functions of the Air Directorate were aligned as closely as possible to those of the Air Staff. For example, the Air Directorate prepared an ANG budget, worked it through the Air Force's board structure process to incorporate it in that service's Program Objective Memorandum (POM), helped to defend that budget on Capitol Hill, allocated the money to Air Guard units through the ANGSC, and then monitored its expenditure. Within the operations arena, the Directorate made certain that the Air Guard's programs were consistent with Air Force programs yet tailored to the unique responsibilities and capabilities of the Air Guard.

(U) While its basic role had not changed, organizational turbulence and a shifting, sometimes unclear relationship with the ANGSC at Andrews AFB, Maryland were important themes marking the evolution of the Air Directorate during the CY 1986 - CY 1991 period. For example, there were no less than five different chiefs of the directorate's staff during those years. More significantly, the Directorate experienced three different basic organizational alignments during that period. Initially, it functioned separately from the ANGSC. The Support Center had been established in 1976 to accomplish certain technical and operational tasks for the Air Guard. Although technically a separate organization from the Bureau's Air Directorate, the lines between the two had gradually become blurred by a combination of increasing Air Guard involvement in Air Force missions under the total force policy and the physical impossibility of housing all the staff required to support the policymaking, planning, and budgeting aspects of that growing role in the Pentagon.[34]

(U) In 1986, the Air Directorate consisted of nine offices. In addition to the Office of the Director, it included a Programs and Resources Division that formulated the ANG's input to the Air Force's POM. The Comptroller Division was responsible for the budget's progress after the POM was approved through its defense on Capitol Hill and its execution once Congress had appropriated funds. The Plans and Operations Division coordinated all ANG current operations, aircrew training, exercises and deployments, aircraft conversions and war plans. In June 1987, it was also made responsible for management of replacement training units and overall management of aircraft conversions. In February 1986, a Requirements and Development Division was formed to insure that ANG weapons systems, which were usually older and less advanced technologically than their active duty Air Force counterparts, could meet their wartime taskings. Working in conjunction with its test and evaluation facility in Tucson, Arizona, the division participated in systems flight testing of off-the-shelf equipment, limited system evaluations and new technologies analysis under the auspices of Headquarters, Tactical Air Command (TAC). It identified war fighting and training requirements as well as assisted in the management of modification and acquisition programs.

(U) The Logistics Division administered the Air Guard's logistics support including weapon systems, aircrew training devices and supporting systems, support equipment, determining quantitative logistical requirements, mobility planning, base level supply and equipment budget authorizations, supply systems, host tenant agreements, maintenance engineering, transportation, readiness, and weapons systems conversions. The Manpower and Personnel Division was responsible for the ANG's full-time military manpower and personnel programs. Its responsibilities encompassed mobilization contingency plans, unit readiness, federal recognition and probation, officer and enlisted personnel actions, recruiting and retention, and civilian personnel. The Engineering and Services Division was responsible for military construction (MILCON) programs, real property acquisition and disposal, environmental and base services, fire protection, leases and airport use agreements, as well as the RED HORSE, Prime BEEF, and Prime RIBS programs. Finally, an Office of Information Services was established on 1 June 1987. It administered the Air Guard's ground information systems equipment and personnel.[35] Illustration I-5 portrayed the Air Directorate's organization within the NGB as of 30 September 1986.

(U) Following his appointment as Director of the Air Guard, General Killey began reorganizing and combining the Air Directorate and the ANGSC into a "one umbrella" organization in the spring of 1989. Although never formally sanctioned by the Air Force or the NGB, the Support Center's name was changed to National Guard Bureau, Andrews. The existing deputy director's position was eliminated. In its place, the Bureau established two general officer assistant director positions. The first, the Deputy Director for Policy, Plans, and Programs was placed in the Pentagon. It was filled by Colonel Donald W. Shepperd who was promoted to brigadier general and assumed the position on 1 August 1989. The second was the Assistant Director for Readiness Support. That position was placed at Andrews AFB and filled by Colonel Larry K. Arnold on 4 December 1989. Although, the Air Force validated that it was a general officer position, it refused to let the Bureau fund it. All ANG general officers on active duty counted against the Air Force's shrinking quota of flag rank positions. Efforts to bring Colonel Arnold aboard as a civilian were rejected by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Consequently, he remained in federal service as a colonel. Colonel Arnold was also dual-hatted as the Commander of the NGB contingent at Andrews (ie., the Air National Guard Support Center). Another major element of the reorganization was moving the Chief of the Air Directorate's staff position to Andrews AFB to " . . . assist in the process of upgrading the Andrews Center to equal partnership with the Directorate Staff." According to General Killey, "The purpose of the reorganization was to develop the team and staff process which will carry us through the massive budget and force

structure changes that will occur as our defense budget is reduced." [36]

(U) The "one umbrella" organization, although a formal recognition of the realities of the Air Directorate's growing role in administering the Air Guard, did not last long. It was doomed by sweeping historical changes far beyond the control of the National Guard Bureau and its Air Directorate. Against the background of shrinking defense budgets, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the end of the Cold War, two major initiatives killed the "one umbrella" organization. First, the Defense Management Review (DMR), launched by the Bush administration in 1989, sought to cut costs in the Defense Department by reorganizing the way it did business and removing unneeded manpower. Second, faced with the prospect of dramatic force structure cuts and determined to preempt unilateral congressional actions, Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice and the Chief of Staff, Gen Merrill A. McPeak moved to restructure and streamline the service. Under the auspices of the DMR, a serious attack was made on the ANGSC in 1990. Critics charged that the Center was performing tasks that could be more properly performed by the Air Force MAJCOMS, the NGB, and Air Force headquarters. The Air Directorate strongly resisted the initiative. Historically, the growth of the Bureau's staff had been driven by the acquisition of new missions and the inability or unwillingness of the MAJCOMS to adequately represent the Air Guard's interests. Although that particular DMR initiative was defeated, the Center was scheduled to lose 65 manpower authorizations in FY 1992.

(U) Air Force streamlining and restructuring also had a significant impact on the Air Guard's management headquarters. It had begun with the "Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986," commonly known as the "Goldwater-Nichols Act" because of its principal co-sponsors, Senator Barry Goldwater (R. AZ) and Representative Bill Nichols (D. AL). Enacted by the Congress on 17 September 1986, it set in motion the most sweeping reorganization of the active duty American military establishment in 40 years. Primarily driven by the strong desire of the Congress to strengthen the authority of the JCS Chairman as well as that of the commanders-in-chief of the unified commands, the legislation also sought to scale back headquarters' staffs. While the Air Guard considered itself technically exempt from the act because it was a joint agency of the Army and the Air Force, that argument did not prevail. The Air Directorate was obliged to sustain a 15 percent staff reduction. That action cut 25 positions in the Air Directorate.

(U) In the fall of 1990, Secretary Rice and General McPeak had launched a sweeping organizational review. In addition to the MAJCOMS, it involved ". . . the Secretariat and Air Staff functions, responsibilities, alignments and supporting organizations. Factors influencing . . . this action include the reduction of Air Force force structure and end strength, the Congressionally mandated 20% management headquarters reduction and MAJCOM management reductions." During 1991, Secretary Rice announced actions that were being taken as a result of the review. Instead of accomplishing its budget reductions by eliminating expensive new weapons including the B-2 bomber, F-22 fighter, and C-17 transport, the service's senior leaders had opted to slash its force structure and bureaucratic overhead. The Secretary of the Air Force noted that three major commands -- the Strategic Air Command (SAC), the Tactical Air Command (TAC), and the Military Airlift Command (MAC) -- were being eliminated. Their resources were being merged into two new organizations, the Air Combat Command (ACC) and the Air Mobility Command (AMC) that better reflect the realities of contemporary air warfare. The ACC would control SAC's bombers, tankers, reconnaissance aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as TAC's fighters and some of MAC's tactical transports. The AMC would combine MAC's strategic airlifters and remaining tactical transports with a significant portion of SAC's tankers. The President approved, in a related policy initiative, the establishment of the new U.S. Strategic Command which would have operational control of all Air Force and Navy strategic nuclear weapons.

(U) Secretary Rice and General McPeak had also approved a plan to eliminate Air Force Reserve numbered air force headquarters and 15 of 19 active component air divisions. More than 8,600 positions would be sliced from the service's Pentagon and field management organizations. The service's officer corps would be reduced by 14,000 and its civilian workforce by 28,000 during the next three years. The cuts included the elimination of approximately 700 positions at Air Force headquarters. Some 17.5 percent of the service's general officer authorizations would be cut. Air Force separate operating agencies (SOAs) and direct reporting units (DRUs) would be redesignated field operating agencies (FOAs). The new designation was designed to more accurately reflect their roles in operations and in implementing policies developed at higher organizational echelons. Previously, SOAs and DRUs had blurred in practice established distinctions between policymaking and execution. In the field, squadron commanders were gaining control of flightline logistics and maintenance functions that had previously been controlled at the wing level. Wherever possible, the service planned to make certain that general officers would command bases and their associated operational wings and support organizations.[37]

(U) In response to the DMR and the Air Force restructuring initiative, General Killey initiated an in depth review of the Air Directorate's management structure and those of its field operating agency and related activities in late 1990. While assuring Air Force headquarters of the Air Guard's desire to cooperate, he reminded it that "arbitrary staff cuts" would undermine his organization's ability to perform the Bureau's statutory role. He also emphasized that " . . . any future reductions should be based on sound management principles and force structure realities . . . . Future expectations are that the ANG's force structure will remain constant."[38]

(U) Apparently, that measured approach to reorganization was not considered adequate. As the summer of 1991 approached, the successful conclusion of the Persian Gulf War as well as the Headquarters USAF restructuring and congressionally-mandated headquarters cuts, lent a renewed sense of urgency to Air Directorate restructuring. Consequently, on 4 June 1991, General Killey launched an "immediate exercize" to determine how the Air Directorate " . . . should be modified and improved, changing the concept of one umbrella structure, all under the Director, ANG in the Pentagon, to two organizations, one NGB in the Pentagon and one Field Operating Agency (FOA) commanded by the FOA commander at Andrews."[39]

(U) In late August 1991, General Killey briefed General McPeak on the Air Directorate's reorganization proposal. The Air Force Chief of Staff approved in principle the proposed new structure which scrapped the existing "one umbrella" organization. To insure compatibility with the new Air Staff organization, the Air Directorate would be split into two separate organizations. The operation at Andrews AFB would be removed from the Pentagon's ANG staff and organized as a separate FOA. The head of the Air Directorate would no longer be dual-hatted as commander of the center at Andrews AFB. Essentially, the new FOA would be responsible for executing plans, policies, and budgets formulated by the Air Directorate. The ANGSC would be eliminated as a DRU of Headquarters, U.S. Air Force and redesignated as an Air Force FOA alligned under the NGB. To emphasize its central mission of assuring the readiness of ANG units to accomplish their missions under the total force policy, the Air National Guard Support Center would be renamed the Air National Guard Readiness Center (ANGRC). The center was programmed to lose 65 manpower positions under the auspices of the DMR. The Air Staff restructure cut 19 positions from the Air Directorate and realigned another 22 out of the Pentagon to Andrews AFB. Secretary Rice approved the Air Guard restructure proposals in September 1991. Once Mr. Rice gave the green light, the Air Guard began using the term "Air National Guard Readiness Center" publicly that same month. The ANG did not actually formally request that the Air Force approve the name change until 12 February 1992.

(U) To plan and implement the detailed changes associated with the DMR process and General McPeak's restructuring initiative, General Killey established an Organizational Improvement Board (OIB). The OIB involved the heads of each functional organization in the Air Directorate and the Support Center at Andrews AFB.[40]

(U) General Killey acknowledged that "The OIB review is proving to be a difficult and time consuming process which will eventually examine every detail of the way the Air Directorate and the ANGRC accomplish their workloads . . . . " Although he did not expect to complete the OIB process until 30 June 1992, the Air Guard Director began to implement organizational changes approved by the Air Force Chief of Staff in late 1991.[41] Consequently, by 15 January 1992 the evolving structure of the Air Directorate consisted of eight offices. General Killey continued to head a small staff in the Office of the Director, Air National Guard. He was assisted by General Shepperd who served as the Assistant Director for Policy, Plans and Programming. The Air Directorate included seven additional offices: the Director of Logistics; the Director of Financial Management/Comptroller; the Office of the Air Surgeon; the Directorate of Operations, Plans, and Programs; the Directorate of Personnel; the Office of Requirements and Development; and the Civil Engineer.

(U) Despite many changes, there were some basic organizational continuities at the end of 1991 with the Air Directorate as it had existed in 1986. For instance, the Directorate of Logistics, the Directorate of Requirements and Development, and the Office of the Surgeon exercised fundamentally similar responsibilities. However, there had been some striking changes. The Directorate of Plans and Operations, encouraged by the elimination of the separate Air Staff organization responsible for building the Air Force POM--the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs and Resources--had added programming to its multifaceted responsibilities. In the process, it had become the Directorate for Operations, Plans, and Programs. The Office of Information Systems had been moved into the ANGSC's organizational structure from the Air Directorate. In the process, it was renamed the Directorate of Command, Control, Communications, and Computers. The Comptroller Division had been renamed the Directorate of Financial Management and Comptroller. Finally, a Civil Engineer's office had been established in the Air Directorate while the old Engineering and Services Division had been consolidated at the Support Center as the Director of Engineering and Services.

(U) As part of the reorganization, the ANGSC was redesignated as the Air National Guard Readiness Center (ANGRC). It was commanded by Colonel Arnold. In addition to his immediate staff, his organization included: a Staff Management Office; the 8201st Mission Support Squadron; the Directorate of Logistics; the Directorate of Financial Management; the Office of the Chaplin; the Directorate of Command, Control, Communications, and Computers; the Training Directorate; the Directorate of Safety, Security and Inspections; the Director of Engineering and Services; the Directorate of Manpower and Organization; and the Operations Directorate.

The Air National Guard Support Center

(U) The Air National Guard Support Center had been activated at Andrews AFB, Maryland effective 21 October 1976. It was a NGB initiative to accommodate a cut of sixteen civilian positions from the Bureau mandated by Headquarters, USAF as part of the service's post Vietnam War reductions. Maj Gen John J. Pesch, then ANG Director, emphasized that his staff could not continue to handle its enormous workload while sustaining the proposed cuts. Consequently, in February 1976 he suggested that the Air Force authorize a new activity at Andrews AFB to handle some ANG operational functions that were currently the responsibility of his Pentagon staff. After months of discussion with Air Force headquarters, the suggestion was approved and General Pesch was given the additional responsibility of being the center's commander. Originally the ANGSC was established as a "named unit" of the Air Force. After an exchange of letters between the NGB and Air Force headquarters in 1977, both agreed that the Center would be a "named activity" assigned to Headquarters, U.S. Air Force but that it would not be a management headquarters and its manpower authorizations would not be included in the Air Staff's total. On 1 June 1979, the Center was inactivated as a named activity. Concurrently, it was redesignated and activated as a direct reporting unit (DRU) and assigned to the U.S. Air Force.

(U) As noted previously, in 1991 General McPeak approved conversion of the Support Center to the Air National Guard Readiness Center and its designation as a Field Operating Agency. The reorganization of the Center was part of General McPeak's larger restructuring of the Air Force which sought to establish a clear organizational split between policymaking, planning, and programming activities at management headquarters and the execution of decisions by subordinate entities.

(U) Although formally established in 1976, the Support Center traced its roots to the Vietnam War. During that conflict, the Air Guard had provided airlift support to American forces in Southeast Asia (SEA). While the NGB remained responsible for centralized command and control of those operations, starting in the summer of 1964 it periodically tasked the command post of the 118th Military Airlift Wing at Berry Field in Nashville, Tennessee " . . . to coordinate, schedule, and monitor large scale domestic airlifts as well as overseas training flights and MAC channel missions to SEA." The facility became known as the ANG Airlift Operations Center (AOC). In May 1968, it began around-the-clock operations. By August 1972, driven by growing Air Guard responsibilities under the total force policy and a declining emphasis on strategic airlift, a proposal emerged from the NGB to transform the AOC into an Air Operations Center and shift its location to Edgewood Arsenal north of Baltimore, Maryland.

(U) The Bureau established a Field Operating Activity Center at the arsenal in October 1973. It was " . . . responsible for portions of NGB functions relating to the management of aviation, construction, readiness, maintenance and training areas." The move was completed on 1 February 1974. Subsequently, the new organization became known as the ANG Field Support Facility. However, its days at Edgewood were numbered. Because it was too far removed from the Pentagon, General Pesch did not consider the arsenal an appropriate location for his planned Air Guard SOA in 1976.[42]

(U) In December 1976, General Pesch had selected a site for the center on the east side of Andrews AFB consisting of six vintage World War II buildings scheduled for demolition. The structures were rehabilitated by the Air Guard using a self help approach. In 1981, Congress authorized the construction of a permanent facility on the same side of the base. Personnel began moving into the new facility early in 1984.[43]

(U) The ANGSC experienced a steady growth of personnel as its responsibilities expanded. On 10 October 1977, the final Air Guard elements from the Edgewood Arsenal completed their move to Andrews AFB. From the initial 16 authorizations in 1976, the Center expanded to 622 positions by April 1992. Its assigned personnel strength** also grew rapidly, from 91 in FY 1979 to 447 in FY 1989. The principal factors driving that growth included: activation of an ANG weapon system conversion "Ready Team;" implementation of environmental restoration programs; movement of the ANG's manpower, logistics, and engineering organizations from the Pentagon to Andrews AFB; the merger and reorganization of the ANG's plans and programming functions; and establishment of the 8200th Management Engineering Squadron. The center's organization, as it had evolved during the 1980s, reflected the wide variety of ANG missions and activities. As previously noted, Illustration I-8 shows its principal organizational elements along with those of the Air Directorate at the Pentagon.[44]

Long Range Planning

** (U) Those figures excluded operating locations, the 8200nd Management Engineering Squadron, and the 8201st Mission Support Squadron.

(U) The long range planning was employed by organizations to define future goals and select strategies to achieve them. Since World War II, the Air Force had published a number of long range plans that, according to the accepted institutional wisdom, had played important roles in shaping its future. Among the most celebrated of them were "Toward New Horizons" in 1945 and "Project Forecast II" in 1986. Both of those documents addressed the service's technological future. However, such early planning efforts tended to be episodic and restricted to a few narrow Air Force missions. It was difficult to establish what impact, if any, they had actually had on the service's policies and programs.

(U) Long range planning was institutionalized in Headquarters, U.S. Air Force by the Secretary of the Air Force, John C. Stetson, in 1977. Under the leadership of Maj Gen Perry McCoy Smith, the Air Staff's Director of Plans, long range or strategic planning enjoyed renewed emphasis in the Pentagon in the early 1980s. General Smith's long range planners met privately with the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff every month or two. At each meeting, they discussed a specific issue such as the consolidation of rescue and special operations forces under the MAC. That idea came to fruition in 1983. To encourage creativity and the free interplay of ideas, those confidential exchanges between the planners and the Air Force's top leadership were not coordinated with either the MAJCOMS or other Air Staff organizations.

(U) Outside the planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) which had been launched during the 1960s by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, the Air Guard had no role in the Air Force's long range planning process. But, as the decade of the 1980s drew toward its end, Air Guard leaders and staff members in the Pentagon had begun to understand the need to take a more active role in charting the long term future of their reserve component. Most of their energies were focused upon daily crisis management as well as obtaining the resources necessary to accomplish the Air Guard's growing missions. They realized that such a "business as usual" approach would be ineffective in a world being transformed by sweeping economic, social, political, and military changes. Moreover, they wanted a vehicle to influence Air Force long range planning efforts. General Conaway, then the ANG Director, authorized Lt Col Douglas M. Olsen of his staff to formulate a long range planning proposal for the Air Guard in late 1987. Once convinced that it would not limit his ability to make adjustments in programmatic and other key matters, the Air Guard Director had given Lt Col Olsen the green light. General Conaway had also directed the creation of an Air National Guard Strategic Planning Steering Group. Its mission was to formulate, with the aid of the Air Directorate and the ANGSC staffs, " . . . a road map or game plan to cover all our functional areas to improve our capabilities to <u>leverage</u> strategic (Long Range) planning within the ANG." Brig Gen John F. McMerty, then Deputy Director of the Air National Guard, was selected by General Conaway to chair the panel. Initially, the steering committee met monthly. Then, beginning in August 1988, it

convened on a quarterly basis.[45]

(U) The steering committee held its first meeting on 6 January 1988 in the offices of National Security Analysts (NSA) Incorporated in Alexandria, Virginia. NSA played an important role in the Air Guard's long range planning effort. Filled with individuals with significant Pentagon and long range planning experience, the contractor was hired to write reports and facilitate the entire process. Furthermore, although the Air Directorate had the funds to conduct long range planning, it lacked the manpower authorizations to do the job within the NGB.

(U) The steering committee drew heavily on the ideas of General Smith as delineated in his Creating Strategic Vision, published by the National Defense University Press in 1987. Smith's ideas were encapsulated in his fifteen laws*** of long range planning. He was convinced that most, if not all of them, had to be followed if such planning efforts were going to have any significant impact on decision-making in government.

*** (U) General Smith's laws of long range planning were: (1) the agency must believe it is worthwhile, (2) decision makers must support it, (3) planners must have direct access to decision makers, (4) it must not be filtered by normal staff agencies, (5) it must lead to some decisions in the present, (6)it must be institutionalized, (7) it must remain flexible, (8) work ad hoc studies, (9) it must be readable and short, (10) develop implementation strategies, (11) avoid restricting vision, (12) avoid single-factor causality, (13) avoid thinking that future events are outside our control, (14) maintain close contact with the field, and (15) provide incentives to the long range planner. SOURCE: Brfg (U), Lt

(U) The steering committee agreed on the essential elements of the Air Guard's long range planning process. It defined that effort as "A systematic process of formulating objectives for the future and developing strategies for achieving them." The planners avoided state or local unit issues concentrating instead on national level concerns. Furthermore, they did not deal with specific programs and weapons systems. Instead, like the Air Force, they concentrated on suggesting the general capabilities which the ANG needed to attain 15 to 20 years in the future. The entire process was an exercise in consensus building designed to develop a corporate Air Guard view, not just a Pentagon wish list, for the distant future. Consequently, the states and territories were brought into the process through the creation of three regional planning committees. Each of the regional committees met twice a year and then annually with representatives of the other regions. The typical regional committee member was a colonel who was either from state headquarters or was a wing or group commander. Each of the three regional committees was headed by a brigadier general. The regional chairmen were also members of the national steering committee. [46]

Col Thomas J. Berry, Jr., NGB/PD, "Air National Guard Long Range Planning," 25 Mar 92, **SD I-64**.

(U) The Air Guard adopted the long range planning methodology established by the Air Force in the 1970s. The key to its success was the emphasis placed upon it by the Air Guard's senior leadership. The process envisaged a " . . . continuous dialogue between top decision makers and long range planners on issues important to the long range future of the organization." Subjects for inclusion in the planning process could be suggested by any individual or organizational level in the Air Guard. It was essential to retain flexibility in the process. Planners expected that, over time, some assumptions in the plan would be invalidated and the emphasis within the document would shift to other areas. Initially, the long range planning effort would be accomplished on an annual basis. The first plan was issued in March 1989. It was followed by annual versions published in January 1990 and May 1991.

(U) The value of joint long range planning with the ARNG was discussed by the steering committee. But, the Army approach was fundamentally different than the Air Guard's. The Army Guard employed a highly decentralized system that was focused at the state level and designed to generate biennial programming inputs to the POM. It would have taken an enormous amount of time and effort to blend the two systems. Because it did not want to slow the momentum of its fledgling program, the steering committee recommended against joint Army and Air National Guard long range planning in October 1988.[47] Illustration I-8 displays an idealized version of the ANG's long range planning process.

(U) The Air Guard completed three annual long range plans between 1989 and 1991. The first, published in March 1989, established the framework and process for that activity within the ANG. The 1989 ANG long range plan also identified three broad categories within which most long range planning would occur. These were the roles and missions for the ANG, the proper force mix between the active duty and reserve components of the Air Force, and personnel and training. The 1989 long range plan " . . . identifies and describes the issues in each of these areas but does not attempt to resolve them. . . . As each issue is resolved, it will be incorporated into subsequent editions of this Plan as Planning Guidance."[48]

Illustration I - 8 (U)

ANG Long Range Planning Process*

*SOURCE: Plan (U), NGB/PE, "1989 Air National Guard Long Range Plan," Mar 89, p 9, **SD I-69**.

(U) The steering committee designated three key issues for study in 1989. First, following extensive consultations with state planners, it directed a review of whether primary ownership of a weapon system or mission by the Air Guard was desirable. The issue was assigned to NSA Incorporated for study. The corporate ANG position on the issue, set forth in the 1991 long range plan, was that primary ownership was not advisable. However, the Air Guard recognized that it was a growing reality driven by continuing reductions in the defense budget and the active force. To deal with that difficult situation, the 1991 plan suggested that the ANG become involved at all levels of the Air Force in planning, programming, budgeting and executing force structure options for such missions or weapons systems.[49]

(U) The second issue chosen for further study in 1989 was very significant. It involved establishing criteria that could be employed " . . . to test the suitability of a mission to the traditional Guard force structure and organization."[50] As international tensions had decreased and defense spending had declined in real terms, there had been greater pressure to move force structure into the reserve components from the active force. However, there was no clear guidance within the Defense Department on how to allocate missions and force structure between the active and reserve components of the American military. Consequently, an ad hoc committee of ANG commanders and other senior leaders, as well as state ANG long range planners was established to address the problem. The committee concluded that because of the enormous number of variables involved, confusion over the definition of terms, and the lack of adequate measuring devices that it was impossible to develop a mathematical model to address the issue. Instead, it formulated a series of general principles that could be used as a checklist in making force mix decisions.

(U) The most significant principle was that "The ANG's Role as a Part-Time Militia Force Should be Preserved."[51] That concept recognized the central dilemma which the Air Guard faced in the post Cold War era. As it was pressured to take on greater and greater military responsibilities, planners and policymakers tended to lose sight of the fact that the typical Air Guardsman had a dual identity. The ad hoc committee noted that "He wants to be recognized by his active duty counterpart as a member of the first team while, at the same time, retain his citizen soldier ties to civilian job, community, and state. With increased tasking, these two desires have become, more and more, mutually exclusive."[52] As a part - time organization, there were limits on what missions the Air Guard could accept without undermining the savings that were an essential element of its appeal. The ad hoc committee stressed that " . . . the ANG must resist the temptation to accept new roles and new units without adequate resources. Not to resist would result in the ANG becoming 'a shallow, cadre - type force in being.'"[53] Rather than provide specific recommendations on what ANG - Air Force force mix was appropriate, the ad hoc committee developed a checklist of criteria for use in facilitating such decisions. It urged that those criteria be made available to DoD planners and decisionmakers grappling with those issues.[54]

(U) The last issue selected in 1989 -- providing grade relief to the states in the promotion of AGR members -- was very sensitive. It was given to the National Guard Bureau's Office of Plans, Analysis, and Evaluation for study. However, it apparently was impossible for the NGB to resolve the contentious issues that the study brought to the surface. Consequently, the AGR study was redirected into a larger study of full-time manning and the desirability of having a single full-time manning system for the National Guard. Subsequently, the latter effort was suspended because the controversial issue was being addressed by the OPM.[55]

(U) The 1990 long range plan was published in January of that year. It set forth several major trends which were expected to influence the Air Guard's planning environment for years to come. They included: more women in the military, tighter defense budgets, the rising importance of the Pacific rim, technological changes that would have a significant impact on the military, increased immigration, a decreased American military presence abroad, and a smaller active duty military force accompanied by a greater reliance on the reserve components. That planning environment was developed by ANG state planners during the autumn of 1989. It was based upon their analysis of potential futures* set forth in Charles Taylor's "Alternative World Scenarios for Strategic Planning" published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the Army War College in 1988.

---

* (U) Those alternative scenarios were: (A) the U.S. as an isolationist power in a relatively peaceful world, (B) the U.S. as the world's peacekeeper, (C) rising global

(U) During 1989, the steering committee agreed to address four additional issues through the long range planning process. These were: developing of a methodology for force structure changes in the ANG that addressed missions, organizations, and units; assessing future Air Guard personnel needs and availability; developing new organizational concepts to support non-traditional missions; and examining the potential impact of lowering Air Guard readiness levels.[56]

---

neonationalism that has significantly reduced U.S. influence, and (D) a muted bipolar world in which the U.S. emphasized social and welfare investments over military ones.

(U) In May 1991, the Air Guard published its third long range plan. Much of its attention focused on "volunteerism," an issue that the steering committee had selected for study in February 1990. Subsequent developments in the Persian Gulf had given a sense of urgency to the matter. The office of primary responsibility for the issue had been the Plans Division of Directorate for Operations, Plans, and Program within the NGB. In addition, the issue had been given extended consideration by the long range planners at the regional meetings and by the steering committee. Apparently, operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm helped to change attitudes within the Air Guard on volunteerism, a trend which had previously been viewed with some skepticism by senior leaders due to the Guard's historic emphasis on maintaining unit integrity. The consensus ANG position that emerged during the long range planning process -- discussed at length in the "Operations" chapter of this history -- was that volunteerism was a viable option within limits. But, it had to be coordinated by the NGB with the Air Force to be fully effective. Moreover, the planners emphasized that Air Guard units should be used as integral organizations as much as possible.[57]

(U) In addition to volunteerism, the Air Guard addressed a widening circle of issues in its 1991 long range plan. For example, the ad hoc committee established in 1990 to examine non - traditional missions concluded that the Air Guard should be a candidate for all missions subject to review by the "Force Mix Decision Checklist" published in the 1990 plan. However, the committee cautioned that decisions on new missions must preserve the ANG's traditional militia role with its dual state - federal status. It stressed that " Current laws governing involuntary activation of the ANG protect against imprudent and unduly frequent mobilization. Any changes to these laws must preserve his protection and be carefully constructed to consider the part-time status of these airmen." As identified in the 1990 long range plan, another ad hoc committee had been established to develop a methodology to assess the Air Guard's capabilities for accepting force structure changes. Use of the methodology, presented as a matrix in the 1991 long range plan, was not mandatory. Instead, it provided a way for planners and decision - makers to conduct an " . . . objective analysis of each unit's/state's capability to accommodate force structure/mission change proposals." That objective would be coupled with the development of a data base composed of the " . . . essential elements for analyzing a unit's/states capability and potential." Some topics, introduced earlier in the long range planning process, required further study. They included: future Air Guard personnel needs and availability, the future of the statutory tour program, and the impact on the ANG of lower readiness levels. Special topics initiated in the long range planning process during 1991 featured: the

lessons learned from operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, airspace management, the role of the Guard in environmental management, and applying the Quality Through Teamwork (QTT) concepts to the operations of the NGB's Air Directorate.[58]

(U) Acknowledging the dramatic changes that had transformed the international scene and federal budget priorities, the Air Guard's long range planners looked to the future with optimism. They concluded that " . . . the ANG is confident of its position as a key member of the Total Force." They were certain that the 1991 Air Guard long range plan ". . . should enhance our ability to respond proactively to the fast pace of change in world events while moving toward an institutional vision of the future."[59] For General Killey, that vision was of an Air Guard "sized, trained, and equipped to perform missions in full partnership with the United States Air Force - - Comprised of quality people, serving nation, state, and community -- Ready to wage war, build nations, and add value to America."[60]

Summary and Conclusions

(U) Under the auspices of the total force concept (later policy) adopted by the Defense Department in 1970 and a substantial increase in military spending during the 1980s, the Air Guard gradually evolved into a true force in reserve of the U.S. Air Force. But, while the total force policy had been successfully applied by the Air Force to the ANG and the AFRES, Congress had grown increasingly skeptical about its use elsewhere in the DoD. Consequently, it began to regularly appropriate money in the 1980s for reserve components' equipment that had not been requested in the President's budget. It also mandated that the Defense Department complete a formal assessment of the total force policy. The resulting study, delivered to Capitol Hill in December 1990, drew a firestorm of criticism because it appeared to downgrade the future role of the reserve forces. The Air Guard feared that the report might presage a shift in official DoD policy that would undermine its hard fought efforts to strengthen its combat capabilities. Those capabilities had been enhanced during the 1980s by the Air Guard's emphasis on modernization, readiness, and growing personnel strength. Most of the latter had been driven by the ANG's increase in non-flying, mission support units.

(U) The NGB continued to serve as a joint agency of the Departments of the Army and the Air Force. Under General Conaway's leadership, it had begun to focus on the long range challenges facing the National Guard in the wake of the Cold War. In addition to performing its established state and federal missions, the Chief's reforming vision of the future included an increasing emphasis on newer "community" missions such as drug interdiction and environmental protection that "added value to America."

(U) The Air Directorate of the NGB and the ANGSC experienced significant organizational turbulence during the CY 1986 - CY 1991 period. That turbulence was driven by the conflicting demands of growing mission responsibilities under the total force policy while the Air Force was experiencing dramatic budget reductions and restructuring. In an effort to navigate through the uncertainties of a rapidly changing world, the Air Guard began to develop and institutionalize a long range planning process in 1988. Subsequently, it published annual long range plans in 1989, 1990, and 1991 which addressed such key issues as: the suitability of new missions, what the ANG's position should be on primary ownership of missions and weapons systems; and "volunteerism."

(U) While retaining its unique dual state-federal status, the Air Guard had gradually evolved into a combat-ready reserve component of the U.S. Air Force since the late 1940s. Essentially, it had done this by being integrated into the everyday planning and operational activities of the Air Force across most of the latter's mission areas. This process was helped by a number of factors including relatively lavish Air Force budgets during the Cold War, the appeal of a high technology organizaton as well as the adaptability of air operations to the training needs (and limitations) of part-time citizen airmen. More fundamentally, the senior leadership of the Air Force and Air Guard had reached an accommodation over the years. The former recognized the contributions, both political and military, which a properly developed ANG could make to the total Air Force. The latter had been willingly co-opted by the Air Force in return for modern equipment, real missions, and highly realistic training. Another key factor had been the strong political support the Air Guard had enjoyed on Capitol Hill.

(U) While primarily a fighter force with a heavy emphasis on the air defense mission, the ANG had gradually diversified its missions begining in the late 1950s. Increasingly, its force structure had emphasized airlift and tanker missions. During the Reagan administration's defense buildup, the ANG's senior leadership resisted Air Force pressures to significantly expand its flying unit force structure fearing that such units would be politically difficult to cut in the event of any substantial future defense budget retrenchments. However, since the mid-1980s, the Air Guard had dramatically expanded its contingent of non-flying mission support units.

(U) Since its establishment in 1908, the National Guard Bureau had grown into a major staff and operating agency serving the needs of the Army Guard and its air counterpart. Faced with profound international and domestic changes in the U.S., the Bureau had offered a new paradigm to redefine the National Guard's role. In addition to its established state and federal responsibilities, the new paradigm stressed the emergence of a "community mission" that "added value to America" through counter drug operations, youth programs, nation-building activities abroad, and environmental protection projects at home.

(U) Propelled by rapidly rising defense budgets during the early 1980s and effective Air Force implementation of the total force policy, the Air Guard had evolved into a true force in reserve. Its readiness and military capabilities were dramatically illustrated during the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990 - 1991. However, the end of the primary threat which had driven its development -- a high intensity conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO in central Europe -- and shrinking post Cold War defense budgets clouded its future. Would its close partnership with the active Air Force survive amid the inevitable struggle for increasingly scarce resources and missions? More fundamentally, what would America's role in the world be after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union? What kind of military establishment would the American people and their elected representatives support to help the nation play its revised international role? Not withstanding efforts by President Bush, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to preserve a large active duty military establishment under the base force plan, American history suggested that the United States would not accept that option in peacetime. Absent a clear and present danger to the nation's security, history suggested that the nation's reserve components, including the Air Guard, were destined to play a much larger defense role in the years ahead.

(U) To deal with many of the uncertainties created by dramatic changes at home and abroad, the Air Guard's senior leadership initiated a long range planning process in the late 1980s. It sought to define a new vision for the organization as well as specific goals and strategies to attain them with. In the meantime, driven by the DMR and dramatic Air Force restructuring, the NGB's Air Directorate and the ANGSC had experienced substantial organizational turbulence as the Air Guard's leadership came to grips with the immediate implications of the uncertain era the ANG had entered.

Notes

1.. Sen. Sam Nunn (D. GA), Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), "Reserves Superb In Time of Need," The Officer, Feb 92, pp 22, 24-25; Cong. Les Aspin (D-Wisc.), "Defense Helps Peace Chances," The Officer, Feb 92, pp 26, 28-29.
2.. Memo (U), SECDEF Melvin R. Laird to Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al., subj.: "Support for Guard and Reserve Forces," 21 Aug 70, **SD I-1**; David Henry Montplaisir, "The Total Force Policy: A Critical Defense Policy Issue," (Washington, D.C.: Unpublished PhD Dissertation, The Catholic University of America, 1985), p 103; Charles J. Gross, Prelude to the Total Force: The Air National Guard, 1943-1969 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, HQ USAF, 1985), pp 166-167.
3.. Memo (U), SECDEF Laird, "Support for Guard and Reserve Forces," 21 Aug 70, **SD I-1**.
4.. Col Harry G. Summers, Jr., U.S. Army (Ret.), "Risky Reserve Retreat," Washington Times, 2 Apr 92, p G-1.
5.. Ibid.
6.. Ibid.; Montplaisir, "The Total Force Policy," pp 105-107.
7.. Gross, Prelude to the Total Force, pp 116-117, 153, 167-168; Edward J. Philbin and James L. Gould, "The Guard and Reserve: In Pursuit of Full Integration," in Bennie J. Wilson, III, ed., The Guard And Reserve In The Total Force. The First Decade, 1973-1983 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1985), pp 44, 68-69.
8.. Memo (U), SECDEF James R. Schlesinger to Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al, subj.: "Readiness of the Selected Reserve," 23 Aug 73, **SD I-2**.
9.. Rprt (U), Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB), "Readiness Assessment Of The Reserve Components, Fiscal Year 1980," p 2; Montplaisir, "The Total Force Policy," pp 112-116.
10.. Montplaisir, "The Total Force Policy," pp 117-121; Rprt (U), RFPB, "Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components Fiscal Year 1980," p 2.
11.. Rprt (U), RFPB, "FY 1980 Reserve Readiness," p 19.
12.. Memo (U), SECDEF to Members of Defense Resources Policy Board (DRPB), Subj.: "Equipment Shortages in the Guard and Reserve (U)," 21 Jun 82, **SD I-2A**; Memo (U), SECDEF to Secretary of the Army, et al., Subj.: "Priorities for Equipment Procurement and Distribution," 21 Jun 82, **SD I-2B**;

Rprt (U), RFPB, "Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board for Fiscal Year 1989," pp xiii, xvii, 2, 3, 4, 11, 20, 21, 48-49, 79, 99]; Rprt (U), RFPB, "Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board for Fiscal Year 1988," 22 Feb 89, pp xix, xxii, xxiii, 11, 50, 89, 93, 121]; Rprt (U), RFPB, "Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1990. The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board," 2 Mar 91, pp 96, 106, 115.

13.. Rprt (U), Rprt # GAO/NSAID-90-26, GAO, "Reserve Force: DOD Guidance Needed on Assigning Roles to Reserves Under the Total Force Policy, " 7 Dec 89, 1 -5, 27]; SSS (U), NGB - PE1 for C/NGB, et al., subj.: "GAO Report: Reserve Force -- DOD Guidance Needed on Assigning Roles to Reserves Under the Total Force Policy," 12 Jan 89, w/atch Background Paper, **SD I-2C**.

14.. Memo (U), SECAF to Assistant SECDEF for Force Management and Personnel, Subj.: "Total Force Policy Study," 29 Jan 90, **SD I-3**; Memo (U), SECDEF to Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al., Subj.: "Total Force Policy Study," 26 Dec 89, w/atch Charter; **SD I-4**; Grant Willis, "New Total Force Unveiled," Army Times, 28 Jan 91, p 6; Paper (U), OSD, "Members of the Total Force Policy Study Group," undated, **SD I-5**.

15.. Willis, "New Total Force Unveiled;" Jane Callen, "DoD's New Total Force plan Blasted By Congress As Lacking Substance," Inside the Army, 24 Sep 90, p 1; Rep. Les Aspin (D. WI), HASC Chairman, "Does Total Force Remain Vital in Post Cold War?," The Officer, Feb 91, pp 24-27; Paper (U), SAF/FML, Congressional Hearing Resume, Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee (SAC), 102nd Congress, Subj.: "Total Force Policy/National Guard/Reserve Issues," 9 Apr 91, **SD I-6**; Col F.C. Oelrich, USAR, "The `All Active' Contingency Force," The Officer, Sep 91, pp 30 - 33; MFR (U), Charles J. Gross, PhD, Chief, ANG History, NGB/PAH, subj.: "Interview With Brig Gen Donald W. Shepperd, ANG Deputy Director," 1 May 92, **SD I-7**; Rprt (U), Total Force Policy Study Group to SECDEF, "Total Force Policy Report to the Congress," 31 Dec 90, **SD I-8**; Rprt (U), Total Force Policy Study Group, "Total Force Policy Report to the Congress, Supplement," 31 Dec 90; **SD I-9**.

16.. U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1992, hearings, 102d Cong., 1st sess., 1991, pp 538-539.

17.. Ibid., p 539.
18.. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services (HAC), Department of Defense Authorization of Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987. Hearings. Title III - Operation and Maintenance on H.R. 4428. 99th Cong., 2d sess., 27 Feb 86, p 601.
19.. Article (U), "Air National Guard," AIR FORCE Magazine, May 1987, p 160; AFR 45-1, "Purpose, Policy, And Responsibilities For Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve," 2 Jan 87, p 1.
20.. "ANG," Air Force, May 87, p 160; AFR 45-1, 2 Jan 87, p 1; HAC, Hearings on FY 1987 Defense Appropriations. Title III, p 601.
21.. Prepared Statement (U), Department of the Air Force, Maj Gen John B. Conaway, ANG Director, subj.: "FY 1986 Air National Guard Posture Statement and Budget Estimates," Presentation to the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, U.S. House of Representatives, Mar 85, p 3, Document No. 137, CY 1985 ANG History.

22.. Article (U), Lt Gen John B. Conaway, C/NGB, "The Air National Guard: Missions in the 1990s," 5 Apr 91, prepared for public release at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, pp 2-3, **SD I-10**; MFR (U), Charles J. Gross, PhD, Chief of ANG History, with Col Douglas M. Olsen, NGB/CF, Subj.: ANG History, 11 Mar 92, **SD I-11**; HAC Subcommittee Hearings, FY 1992 DoD Appropriations, 16 Apr 91, p 504; "Air National Guard," AIR FORCE Magazine, May 87, pp 160 -161; MFR (U), Charles J. Gross, PhD, Chief, ANG History, NGB/PAH, Subj.: "Meeting with Col Vance Renfroe (NGB/XOO) re ANG History on 21 Feb 92," 11 Mar 92, **SD I-12**; MFR (U), "Interview With General Shepperd," 1 May 92, **SD I-7**.
23.. Gross, Prelude to the Total Force, pp 20, 22, 91, 120, 149; Rprt (U) C/NGB, "1986 Annual Review," p 67; Rene Francillon, The Air Guard (Aerofax, undated), pp 65-70); Rprt (U), C/NGB, "1985 Annual Review," pp 44-45; Rprt (U), RFPB, "Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1991. The Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board," 28 Feb 92, pp 20-21, 61, 95; Rprt (U), RFPB, FY 1987 Report," p 53; Rprt (U), RFPB, "FY 86," p 71; Info Paper (U), Lt Col Dave Cherry, ANGSC/DOX, "OCONOUS Deployments," 29 Aug 89, **SD I-13**; Information Paper (U), Maj Stern, NGB/DEO, "ANG Engineering

and Services OCONUS Deployments," 7 Sep 90, **SD I-14**; Rprt (U), C/NGB, "Annual Report Fiscal Year 1973 - 1974," p 84; Millett and Maslowski For The Common Defense, p 572.
24.. Pamphlet (FOUO), NGB/XO, "Air National Guard Facts and Figures," Jun 91, pp 5, info used was (U), **SD I-15**; Rprt (U), C/NGB, "1986 Annual Review," p 68; Article, "Air National Guard," AIR FORCE Magazine, May 91, p 127; James C. Hyde, "Army Heavies Up; Air Guard Takes on More Missions," Armed Forces Journal International, Sept 91, pp 40, 41; SSS (U) Maj J Reynes, AF/XOOTT, to AF/XO, et al., "Response to Senator Hollings - Modernization of Air National Guard," 16 Aug 91, w/Atchs (2): Ltr (U), Gen McPeak to Senator Hollings, 9 Sep 91; and Ltr (U), Senator Hollings to Gen McPeak, 31 Jul 91, **SD I-16**.

Additional detailled information on the ANG for the period CY 1987-90 was available in four pamphlets published by the Air Directorate. These were: Pamphlet (U), NGB-PR, "Air National Guard Facts and Figures," 13 Nov 87, **SD I-16A**; Pamphlet (U), NGB-PR, "Air National Guard Facts and Figures," 2 Dec 88, **I-16B**; Pamphlet (U), NGB-XO, "Air National Guard Facts and Figures," 20 Jun 90, **SD I-16C**.
25.. "The Air National Guard Organization, Year In Review And Major Units," National Guard Almanac (Falls Church, VA.: Uniformed Services Almanac, Inc., 1992),p 83; "Air National Guard," AIR FORCE Magazine, May 87, pp 160, 162.
26.. Hist (U), Julius Rothstein, NGB-PAH, "The History of the National Guard Bureau," ca 1991, passim.
27.. Rprt (U), Chief, National Guard Bureau (C/NGB), Annual Review of the National Guard Bureau. Fiscal Year 1990 , undated, p 2; AFR 45-17, "Organization and Functions of National Guard Bureau, " 8 Dec 77, passim; Paper (U), NGB-PAH, "List of Chiefs of the National Guard Bureau and Dates During Which Office Was Held," undated, **SD I-17**; Hist (U), ANG, CY 1985, pp 294 -295; Memo (U), Lt Gen Herbert R. Temple, Jr., USA, NGB Chief, To All NGB Personnel, Subj.: "Establishment of the Position of Vice Chief, National Guard Bureau," 15 Jul 88, **SD I-18**; News Release (U), OASD/PA, "Major General John B. Conaway Named Vice Chief of National Guard Bureau," 21 Jul 88, **SD I-19**; Official Biography (U), NGB/PA, "Lieutenant General John B. Conaway, Chief, National Guard Bureau," Mar 90, **SD I-20**; Official Biography (U), NGB/PA, "Major General William A. Navas, Jr.," undated **SD I-**

21; News Release (U), OASD/PA, "Brig Gen William A. Navas, Jr., New Vice Chief of National Guard Bureau," 2 Jul 90, **SD I-22**; Official Biography (U), SAF/PA, "Major General Philip G. Killey," Feb 91, **SD I-23**; Memo (U), Wayne A. Robertson, Special Assistant to C/NGB, To Lt Gen Herbert R. Temple, Jr., C/NGB, Subj.: "NGB Organizational Analysis Report," 28 April 88, **SD I-24**; Memo (U), Lt Gen Herbert R. Temple, Jr., USA, C/NGB, Subj.: "Reorganization Relationships," 25 Jul 88, **SD I-25**.

28.. "Brig Gen Killey: LeaderFrom The Field," National Guard, Feb 89, pp 34-35.
29.. Rprt (U), C/NGB, FY 1990 Annual Review, pp 2, 3; Rprt (U), C/NGB, FY 1986 Annual Review, p 50.
30.. William Matthews, "Nominee sees Guard Opportunities," Air Force Times, 5 Feb 90, p 10; Brfg Slides (U), NGB/PA, "The Chief's Vision" and "National Goals For The 1990s," circa Feb 92, **SD I-26**.
31.. Rprt Extract (U), Office of the Chief, NGB, "VISION 2020," 21 Aug 91, pp 47 - 55, **SD I-27**.
32.. AR 130-5/AFR 45-17 (U), "Organization And Functions Of National Guard Bureau," 8 Dec 77, Section IV, Paragraph 15 d; Office Memorandum 10 - 5/23 - 1 (U), Departments of the Army and Air Force, NGB, "Organization And Functions Of The National Guard Bureau," 30 Sep 86, Paragraph 33, p 118.
33.. Office Memorandum 10-5/23-1 (U), p 118.
34.. MFR (U), Charles J. Gross, PhD, Chief, ANG History, NGB-PAH, subj.: "Interview With Col William T. Sparks, Chief, Directorate Staff, NGB/CF," 16 Mar 92, **SD I-28**; MFR (U), Charles J. Gross, PhD, Chief, ANG History, NGB-PAH, "Conversation With Mr Maury Ison, ANGRC/SM, re History of the ANGSC and the Air Directorate, NGB," 7 Apr 92, **SD I-29**; MFR (U), Dr Gross, "Interview with General Shepperd," 1 May 92, **SD I-7**; MFR (U), Maurice G. Ison, Col, USAF (Ret.), Consultant to the Director, ANG, subj.: "Organizational Policy Changes," 14 May 91, **SD I-30**, Memo (U), NGB/CC to AF/CC, "Air Staff Restructure," 21 Feb 91, w/atch Paper (U), "Air Force Restructure Impact On NGB," **SD I-31**.
35.. Point Paper (U), Maurice G. Ison, Colonel, USAF (Ret.), Organizational Consultant to Director ANG, Subj.: "National Guard Bureau - Army and Air Staff Relationship," undated, **SD I-32**; MFR (U), Dr Gross, "Interview With Col Sparks," 16 Mar 92, **SD I-28**; MFR (U), Dr Gross, "Conversation with Mr Maury

Ison," 7 Apr 92, **SD I-29**; Rprt (U), C/NGB, FY 1987 Annual Review, p 48; Rprt (U), C/NGB, FY 1987 Annual Review, p 64; Rprt (U), C/NGB, FY 1988 Annual Review, pp 76 -77; Office Memorandum 10-5/23-1, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, NGB, "Organization and Functions of the National Guard Bureau," 30 Sep 86, pp 118 - 146; Official Biography (U), SAF/PA, "Brigadier General Donald W. Shepperd," Aug 91, **SD I-33**; Memo (U), Maj Gen John B. Conaway, NGB/CF, to All NGB Directorate Division/Office Chiefs and ANGSC/CD, subj.: "NGB/ANGSC Realignments," 8 May 87, **SD I-34**.

36.. MFR (U), Charles J. Gross, PhD, Chief, ANG History, NGB-PAH, "Interview With Col Larry K. Arnold, Commander, Air National Guard Readiness Center (ANGRC), Andrews AFB, Maryland," 24 Aug 92, **SD I-34A**; Biography (U), ANGRC, Departments of the Army and the Air Force, "Colonel Larry K. Arnold," undated, **SD I-34B**; Memo (U), Maj Gen Philip G. Killey, NGB/CF, to Air Directorate Staff, subj.: "Air Directorate Organizational Changes," 1 Mar 91, **SD I-35**; MFR (U), Dr Gross, "Interview With Col Sparks," 16 Mar 92, **SD I-28**; MFR (U), Dr Gross, "Conversation with Mr Ison," 7 Apr 92, **SD I-29**.

37.. George C. Wilson, "Defense Reorganization Enacted," Washington Post, 18 Sep 86, p A15; SSS (U), Lt Col Levins, NGB/MPM, to NGB/MP and NGB/CF, subj.: Impact of DOD Reorganization Act of 1986," 10 Nov 86, **SD I-35A**; Memo (U), Brig Gen Jon McMerty, ANG Deputy Director, to AF/CVAX, subj.: "Air Force Headquarters Reorganization," 17 Nov 86, w/atch Point Paper, **SD I-35B**; Point Paper (U), Lt Col Manning, NGB-PRM, subj.: "ANG Management Headquarters Reduction," 28 Mar 90, **SD I-35C**; MFR (U), ANGRC/SM Files, subj.: "CSAF Tasking to CF to Brief Air Directorate Structure, FOA Structure and Drawdown Impact," ca Summer 1991, **SD I-36**; MFR (U), Dr Gross Conversation With Mr Ison, 7 Apr 92,**SD I-29**; Brfg (U), Col Dave Sibley, AF/REX, to Active/Air Reserve Components General Officer Steering Group, subj.: "DMR #P0241, Streamline/Eliminate ANG Support Center And Integrate Into Hq USAF and NGB/CF," undated, **SD I-37**; Memo (U), AF/LG to AF/PR, "Thoughts on ANG/AFRES Restructure," 22 Jun 90, **SD I-38**; Memo (U), Ms Joyce B. Lucky, Acting Deputy for Logistics, NGB/LG, to NGB/SM, subj.:"ANG/USAF Restructuring Initiatives (Your Ltrs 9 & 13 Aug 90, same subject)," 21 Aug 90, **SD I-39**; Memo (U), AF/PR to NGB, subj.: "HQ USAF Restructure," 21 Nov 90,

SD I-40; News Release No. 072-91 (U), OASD/PA, subj.: Air Force Streamlining and reorganization, 4 Feb 91, **SD I-40A**; Larry Grossman, "Streamlining for Leaner Times," Government Executive, Dec 91, U.S. Air Force Reprint.
38.. Memo (U), Maj Gen Philip G. Killey, NGB/CF, to AF/PR, subj.: "HQ USAF Restructure (Your letter, 21 Nov 90)," 7 Dec 90, w/atchs(2), **SD I-41**.
39.. MFR (U), M. G. Ison, Consultant to the ANG Director, "Air Force Restructuring Initiative," undated, **SD I-41A**; Memo (U), Maj Gen Philip G. Killey, USAF, Director, ANG, to all NGB Air Directorate/Office Chiefs and 8201st MSSQ/CC, subj.:"ANG Restructuring Initiative," 4 Jun 91, **SD I-41B**.
40.. Memo (U), ANGRC/ Files, "Organization Discussion With CSAF," ca Sep 91, w/atchs: Chart (U), "NGB Baseline Impact Summary;" MFR (U), "CSAF Tasking to CF to Brief Air Directorate Structure, FOA Structure and Drawdown Impact, and Memo (U), "Restructure meeting, 11 Jul 91, MGEN Killey, Col Arnold, Col Wear, and Col Olsen,"**SD I-42**; Local Area Network (LAN) Msg (U), Col Wear, NGB, to Col Lavender, NGB/LG, et al., subj.: "Restructure," 16:04:07 EDT, 3 Sep 91, **SD I-43**; Memo (U), NGB/CF to AF/MO, subj.: "FY 92 Manpower Reductions," 9 Jan 92, w/atchs (3), **SD I-44**; Brfg (U), Maj Gen Philip Killey, NGB/CF, to Gen Merrill A. McPeak, AF/CC, and Mr Donald B. Rice, SAF, "ANG Restructure," ca Aug 91 and Sep 91, **SD I-45**; MFR (U), Charles J. Gross, PhD, Chief, ANG History, NGB/PAH, subj.: "Conversation With Mr Maury Ison re the Redesignation of the Air National Guard Support Center (ANGSC) to the Air National Guard Readiness Center (ANGRC)," 1 Jun 92, **SD I-46**; Ltr (U), HQ USAF/MOO to NGB/XOOP, subj.: "Renaming of the ANG Support Center, Andrews AFB, MD (Your Ltr, 12 Feb 92)," 1 Apr 92, **SD I-47**.
41.. Memo (U), "FY 92 Manpower Reductions," 9 Jan 92, **SD I-44**.
42.. Ltr (U), Mag Gen John J. Pesch, Director, ANG, to Maj Gen Jack T. Posner, AF/PRM, Subj.: Separate Operating Agency for ANG, 10 Feb 76, **SD I-48**; Hist (U), ANG, 1 Oct 77 - 31 Dec 77, pp 11 - 15; Chronology (U), ANGRC/SM Files, "Chronological Evolution of ANG Support Center," undated, **SD I-49**.
43.. Paper (U), "Chronological Evolution of ANG Support Center," **SD I-49**; Memo (U), DAF/PRM 39q to ANG Field Support Center, Subj.: "Air National Guard Field Support Center, a Named Unit," 14 Oct 76, **SD I-50**; SO G-1, Department of the

Air Force, 1 Feb 77, **SD I-51**; Ltr (U), General Pesch, to General Posner, subj.: Separate Operating Agency from the NGB, 10 Feb 76, **SD I-48**; Memo (U), Maj Gen John J. Pesch, Director ANG to AF/PRP, Subj.: "ANG Support Center Location," 3 Dec 76, **SD I-52**; Memo (U), Col Raymond C. Gagnon, USAF, Chief, Civil Engineering Division, to NGB/CF, Subj.: "Buildings for ANGSC," 29 Nov 76, **SD I-53**; MFR (U), Dr Gross, "Conversation with Mr Maury Ison," 7 Apr 92, **SD I-29**; Paper (U), Mr Maury Ison, ANGRC/AP, "Air National Guard Readiness Center, " ca 7 Apr 92, **SD I-54**; Paper (U), ANGSC, unsigned, subj.: The Air National Guard Support Center, 10 Mar 88, **SD I-55**; Paper (U), ANGRC/SM Files, unsigned, "Evolution of NGB Andrews AFB," undated, **SD I-56**.

44.. Paper (U), "Evolution of NGB Andrews AFB," **SD I-56**; Pat Dalton, "ANG Center Executes Air Force Decisions," Air Force Times, 7 Apr 86, p 10 [ANGSC Doc # 11]; Hist (U), ANG, 1 Oct - 31 Dec 77, p 11; Paper (U), ANGRC/SM Files, subj.:"2I [Manpower] Authorization Data [Jul 86 - May 91]," undated, **SD I-57**; Paper (U), ANGRC/SM Files, subj.: "NGB Andrews (ANG Support Center) Strength - FY 79-89, and NGB Pentagon Strength -FY79-90," undated, **SD I-58**.

45.. Maj Gen Perry M. Smith, USAF (Ret.), "Creating Strategic Vision," Air University Review, Sep - Oct 86, pp 16-17, 20 - 21; MFR (U), Brig Gen John F. McMerty, USAF, Chairman, ANG Steering Committee on Long Range Planning, subj.: "Meeting Minutes - 6 Jan 88," 14 Jan 88, **SD I-59**; Background Paper (U), Maj Rhodes, NGB/XOX, subj.: "Long Range Planning (LRP)," 31 Oct 87, **SD I-60**; Memo (U), Maj Gen John B. Conaway, USAF, NGB/CF, to NGB/AC, et al., subj.: "Air National Guard Strategic Planning Steering Group," undated, **SD I-61**; MFR (U), Charles J. Gross, PhD, Chief, ANG History, NGB-PAH, "Interview With Col Douglas M. Olsen, NGB/PQ, re NGB Roles and Recent ANG History on 11 May 1992" 11 May 92, **SD I-62**; MFR (U), Charles J. Gross, PhD, Chief, ANG History, NGB-PAH, subj.: "Meeting with Lt Col Thomas J. Berry, Jr., USAF, (NGB-PD) Regarding the ANG's Long Range Planning Process (LRPP)," 26 Mar 92, **SD I-63**; Brfg (U), Lt Col Thomas J. Berry, Jr., NGB-PD, subj.: "Air National Guard Long Range Planning," 25 Mar 92, **SD I-64**; MFR (U), Brig Gen John F. McMerty, USAF, Chairman, ANG Steering Committee on Long Range Planning, subj.: "Meeting Minutes - 3 Feb 1988," 15 Feb 88, **SD I-65**; MFR (U), Brig Gen John F. McMerty, USAF, Chairman, ANG Steering Committee on Long Range Planning, subj.: "Meeting

Minutes - 3 Mar 88," 4 Mar 88, **SD I-66**; MFR (U), Brig Gen John F. McMerty, USAF, Chairman, ANG Steering Committee on Long Range planning, subj.: "Meeting Minutes - 6 April 1988," 11 Apr 88, **SD I-67**; MFR (U), Brig Gen John F. McMerty, USAF, Chairman, ANG Steering Committee on Long Range Planning, subj.: ""Meeting Minutes - 2 August 1988," 3 Aug 88, **SD I-68**.
46.. MFR (U), Dr Gross, "Meeting with Lt Col Berry on ANG LRPP," 26 Mar 92, **SD I-63**; Brfg (U), Lt Col Berry, "ANG Long Range Planning," 25 Mar 92, **SD I-64**.
47.. Plan (U), NGB/PE, "1989 Air National Guard Long Range Plan," Mar 89, pp 1, 3-4, 8-9, **SD I-69**; MFR (U), Brig Gen John F. McMerty, USAF, Chairman, ANG Steering Committee on Long Range Planning, subj.: "Meeting Minutes - 28 October 1988," 2 Nov 88, **SD I-70**; Rprt (U), Director, Joint Staff, Office of Planning and Development, NGB, "Setting the Compass: Record of the Proceedings On Projecting National Guard Roles Into The Year 2020," 1991, pp 1 -2, **SD I-71**.
1. Plan (U), NGB/PE, "1989 ANG LRP," pp 1, 8 - 9, 10 -13, **SD I-69**; Plan (U), NGB/XOX, "1990 Air National Guard Long Range Plan," pp 5 - 6, **SD I-72.**

49.. Plan (U), NGB/PE, "1989 LRP," pp 12-13, **SD I-69**; Plan (U), NGB/XOX, " 1990 Air National Guard Long Range Plan," Jan 90, pp 10 -11, C -1 to C -6, **SD I-72**.
50.. Plan (U), NGB/PE, "1989 ANG LRP," p 13,**SD I-69**.
51.. Plan (U), NGB/XOX, "1990 LRP," pp 9, B -1 to B - 2, **SD I-72**.
52.. Plan (U), NGB/XOX, " 1990 ANG LRP," p B - 2, **SD I-72**.
53.. Plan (U), NGB/XOX, "1990 ANG LRP," p B - 9, **SD I-72**.
54.. Plan (U), NGB/XOX, "1990 ANG LRP," pp B - 4 to B -8, **SD I-72**.

55.. Plan (U), NGB/PE, "1989 ANG LRP," p 14, **SD I-69**; Plan (U), NGB/XOX, "1990 ANG LRP," pp D - 1 to D - 5, **SD I-72**; Plan (U), NGB/XOX, "Air National Guard 1991 Long Range Plan," May 91, p 22, **SD I-73**.
56.. Plan (U), NGB/XOX, "1990 ANG LRP," pp 5 - 6, 13 - 14, **SD I-72**.
57.. Plan (U), NGB/XOX, "1991 ANG LRP," pp 17 - 18, C - 1 to C -3, D -4, **SD I-73**.
58.. Plan (U), NGB/XOX, "1991 ANG LRP," pp 17 - 30, C - 1 to C - 3, D - 1 to D - 5, E - 1 to E - 5, F - 1 to F - 7, **SD I-73**.
59.. Ibid., p 31.

60.. Ibid., pp vii - viii.